Plan Review: 255 Issues Found

Summary: 216 index entries | 1 perfect matches | 134 mismatched | 81 missing Mismatched (134): A0.0: Expected: COVER SHEET (A0.0) | Actual: null (A0.0)(p1) A0.1: Expected: FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES (A0.1) | Actual: THE OREAD (A0.1)(p2) A0.2: Expected: FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES (A0.2) | Actual: THE OREAD (A0.2)(p3) A0.3: Expected: WALL TYPES (A0.3) | Actual: THE OREAD (A0.3)(...

Why it matters: Addressing this before construction prevents rework and supports code compliance.

Suggested next step: Review drawings and specifications to resolve before construction.

RFI draft: Please clarify: Drawing Index Audit: 81 missing, 134 mismatched out of 216 sheets

Summary: Detail 8 (Sheet A5.22) shows a pre-fabricated limestone cornice (0440.00) projecting 1'-0" horizontally outward from the face of the 6" metal stud framing (0540.08) supporting it. The center of gravity of this massive projecting masonry is entirely outside the middle one-third of the supporting wall. However, the drawing fails to detail any structural steel framing, brackets, or specific anchor...

Why it matters: A 12-inch cantilevered stone cornice creates a severe falling and life-safety hazard. IBC 2101.3 mandates that construction documents explicitly show the details of anchorage, including the type, size, and location of connectors. Without an engineered structural support frame detailed in the draw...

Suggested next step: Provide structural engineering calculations and a revised detail showing the continuous steel framing, brackets, and specific anchors (type, size, and location) required to safely support the projecting limestone cornice in compliance with IBC 2104.2.1 and 2101.3.

RFI draft: Provide structural engineering calculations and a revised detail showing the continuous steel framing, brackets, and specific anchors (type, size, and location) required to safely support the projecting limestone cornice in compliance with IBC 210...

Summary: In Detail 10, the horizontal support ledge for the 4th-floor thin brick veneer (0471.00) is specified as a "GALVANIZED METAL CONTROL JOINT" (0929.04), and its connection to the concrete slab is specified as "METAL STUD FURRING" (0540.05). These are non-structural finishing components that cannot safely resist the superimposed dead loads of the exterior wall assembly, which violates IBC 1403.3.

Why it matters: Specifying light-gauge finishing accessories to act as structural slab embeds and bearing angles will result in inadequate load transfer, potentially leading to bearing failure and veneer collapse. This is a severe life-safety hazard.

Suggested next step: Clarify the structural support requirements for the masonry veneer in Detail 10. Replace keynotes 0929.04 and 0540.05 with an appropriately engineered structural steel bearing angle (e.g., 0540.10) and a properly rated structural slab embed connection.

RFI draft: Clarify the structural support requirements for the masonry veneer in Detail 10. Replace keynotes 0929.04 and 0540.05 with an appropriately engineered structural steel bearing angle (e.g., 0540.10) and a properly rated structural slab embed connec...

Summary: The mechanical roof plan shows mechanical ductwork (labeled '42x12 MAKE-UP AIR UP') routing from the elevator shaft through the adjacent corridor and elevator lobby.

Why it matters: IBC Section 3004.4 explicitly prohibits plumbing and mechanical systems from being located within an elevator hoistway enclosure. Utilizing the elevator shaft as a chase for general building make-up air ductwork compromises the required fire and smoke separation of the hoistway. This can allow sm...

Suggested next step: Please revise the mechanical duct layout so the 42x12 make-up air duct and any other building mechanical systems do not penetrate or route through the elevator hoistway enclosure. Provide an independent, dedicated fire-rated mechanical shaft for this ductwork as required by IB...

RFI draft: Please revise the mechanical duct layout so the 42x12 make-up air duct and any other building mechanical systems do not penetrate or route through the elevator hoistway enclosure. Provide an independent, dedicated fire-rated mechanical shaft for t...

Summary: Detail 8/A7.4 shows cut stone banding (keynote 0443.06) resting directly on a steel shelf angle (0512.21). The detail completely omits through-wall flashing over the shelf angle and provides no weep holes for drainage above it. Furthermore, the joint below the angle is sealed tight with backer rod and sealant (0792.00). IBC 1403.2 states the exterior wall envelope must prevent the accumulation ...

Why it matters: Omitting flashing at a horizontal cavity interruption like a steel shelf angle will cause any penetrating water to pool directly on the support. This inevitably leads to premature corrosion of the shelf angle, structural degradation of the masonry support, and potential spalling of the stone vene...

Suggested next step: Please revise Detail 8/A7.4 to include continuous through-wall flashing above the steel shelf angle that extends to the exterior, and specify the size and spacing of weep holes to provide proper drainage per IBC 1403.2.

RFI draft: Please revise Detail 8/A7.4 to include continuous through-wall flashing above the steel shelf angle that extends to the exterior, and specify the size and spacing of weep holes to provide proper drainage per IBC 1403.2.

Summary: Detail 18/A7.11 shows wood blocking (0610.00) attached to an interior metal stud (0540.01) using lag screws (0505.00). The keynote explicitly specifies lag screws for this connection.

Why it matters: Lag screws are designed with coarse threads exclusively for wood-to-wood connections. They cannot tap into or provide structural pull-out resistance in cold-formed steel framing. Since this blocking supports the sliding door hardware (0870.00), the connection will fail under load, posing a severe...

Suggested next step: Please revise keynote 0505.00 or Detail 18/A7.11 to specify an appropriate self-drilling/self-tapping screw (e.g., TEK screws) designed for fastening wood to cold-formed steel framing, including the required size and spacing.

RFI draft: Please revise keynote 0505.00 or Detail 18/A7.11 to specify an appropriate self-drilling/self-tapping screw (e.g., TEK screws) designed for fastening wood to cold-formed steel framing, including the required size and spacing.

Summary: IBC Section 1615.3.1 requires concrete frame structures to conform to ACI 318 Section 13.3.8.5 for structural integrity. This mandates that structural integrity bottom reinforcement pass continuously through the column core to provide nominal tensile strength. Consequently, ACI 318 requires these bottom bars to be continuous or spliced entirely outside the column core. However, 'CONCRETE SLAB N...

Why it matters: Structural integrity reinforcement is critically designed to provide catenary action and prevent progressive collapse in the event a structural support is lost. A tension lap splice located at the column centerline will lose its concrete bond and fail immediately in a progressive collapse scenari...

Suggested next step: Revise Concrete Slab Note 2 to mandate that the bottom mat reinforcement be continuous through the column core. Clarify that any required tension lap splices for bottom reinforcement must be located strictly outside the region bounded by the longitudinal column reinforcement, ...

RFI draft: Revise Concrete Slab Note 2 to mandate that the bottom mat reinforcement be continuous through the column core. Clarify that any required tension lap splices for bottom reinforcement must be located strictly outside the region bounded by the longi...

Summary: The Beam Schedule and section details specify shear reinforcement (stirrup) spacings that exceed the total depth of the concrete beams. For example, Section 4/S12 shows a 1'-4" (16") deep beam with stirrups spaced at 16". The Beam Schedule lists Beam B106 (16" deep) with a remainder spacing of 36", and Beam B116 (28" deep) with a remainder spacing of 30". According to ACI 318, the maximum spaci...

Why it matters: Stirrup spacings that grossly exceed the beam's effective depth leave large sections of the beam unreinforced for shear, risking brittle shear failure. This directly violates IBC Section 1901.2, which mandates structural concrete be designed and constructed in accordance with ACI 318.

Suggested next step: Please revise the beam schedule and section details to ensure all stirrup spacings comply with the maximum allowable spacing requirements (d/2) per ACI 318.

RFI draft: Please revise the beam schedule and section details to ensure all stirrup spacings comply with the maximum allowable spacing requirements (d/2) per ACI 318.

Summary: Drawing Note 1 calls for a "CARBON MONOXIDE CONTROL SYSTEM" to signal the operation of the garage exhaust fans, but erroneously specifies "CARBON DIOXIDE SENSORS" for the remote devices. Under IBC Section 908.7.1, carbon monoxide detection systems must use carbon monoxide detectors listed to UL 2075. A carbon dioxide (CO2) sensor detects the wrong gas, will not trigger on carbon monoxide (CO), ...

Why it matters: Installing Carbon Dioxide (CO2) sensors instead of Carbon Monoxide (CO) sensors means the garage exhaust system will fail to automatically start in response to hazardous carbon monoxide buildup from vehicle exhaust. This constitutes a severe life-safety risk and a direct violation of emergency de...

Suggested next step: Please revise Floor Plan Note 1 to specify Carbon Monoxide (CO) sensors that are listed to UL 2075, rather than Carbon Dioxide sensors, to ensure the garage exhaust system accurately detects vehicle exhaust and functions as required by IBC 908.7.1.

RFI draft: Please revise Floor Plan Note 1 to specify Carbon Monoxide (CO) sensors that are listed to UL 2075, rather than Carbon Dioxide sensors, to ensure the garage exhaust system accurately detects vehicle exhaust and functions as required by IBC 908.7.1.

Summary: A 24x10 supply/exhaust duct is shown penetrating and routing completely through the interior of the "STAIR 3" enclosure. While Fire Smoke Dampers (FSD) are shown at both partition boundaries of the stairwell, the duct itself serves adjacent suites and the corridor, meaning it is not necessary for the purpose of the stairwell.

Why it matters: Section 713.8.1 prohibits any penetrations into a shaft enclosure (which includes exit stairways protecting vertical openings) that are not necessary for the purpose of the shaft itself. Routing foreign MEP systems through an exit stairway introduces severe risks of smoke and fire transfer into t...

Suggested next step: Please reroute the 24x10 duct so that it completely avoids the STAIR 3 enclosure, remaining entirely outside the stairwell's fire-rated partitions to comply with IBC Section 713.8.1.

RFI draft: Please reroute the 24x10 duct so that it completely avoids the STAIR 3 enclosure, remaining entirely outside the stairwell's fire-rated partitions to comply with IBC Section 713.8.1.

Summary: Section 504.2 dictates a maximum riser height of 7 inches. The "STAIR 6 PLAN 1ST FLOOR" specifies a stair flight with "DN 19 R." descending from the 1st Floor. Section B establishes the "1st FLOOR T/SLAB" at "EL = 112'-8"" and the "LOWER LEVEL T/SLAB" at "EL = 100'-0"", which is a vertical difference of 12'-8" (152 inches). Distributing this 152-inch height evenly over 19 risers results in an 8...

Why it matters: Exceeding the maximum riser height creates a significant fall hazard and fails accessibility regulations. Correcting this requires adding more risers to the stair flights (e.g., at least 22 risers for the 152-inch floor-to-floor height). This will drastically lengthen the required stair run, whic...

Suggested next step: Please redesign the Stair 6 flights to provide a sufficient number of risers so that every riser height is strictly between 4 inches and 7 inches, compliant with Section 504.2. Verify that the enlarged stair run fits within the structural walls.

RFI draft: Please redesign the Stair 6 flights to provide a sufficient number of risers so that every riser height is strictly between 4 inches and 7 inches, compliant with Section 504.2. Verify that the enlarged stair run fits within the structural walls.

Summary: The drawing specifies "2\" THICK, REAL STONE THIN VENEER" in Reference Keynote 0433.01 for the exterior cladding. Section 309.2 of the IEBC requires added or replaced exterior wall coverings to comply with Chapter 14 of the International Building Code. Specifying a 2-inch thickness for real stone is a direct contradiction of the material limitations for adhered "thin" veneer under the Internati...

Why it matters: Installing 2-inch thick real stone using adhered thin veneer methods will result in a severely overloaded adhesive bond, creating an imminent risk of exterior facade failure and falling stone hazards. This will cause failed structural and envelope inspections, requiring significant and costly ext...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the exterior stone veneer specification. If a 2-inch thickness for the real stone is required, revise the architectural and structural details to specify a mechanically anchored masonry veneer system in compliance with the requirements for new construction in Ch...

RFI draft: Please clarify the exterior stone veneer specification. If a 2-inch thickness for the real stone is required, revise the architectural and structural details to specify a mechanically anchored masonry veneer system in compliance with the requireme...

Summary: The framing plan specifies HSS 4x4x1/4 columns anchored with "3/4"φx8" EXP. BOLTS". However, the concrete slab at this location is called out as a "6" CONC. SLAB". An 8-inch expansion bolt cannot be installed in a 6-inch thick slab without penetrating completely through the bottom of the concrete. This physical impossibility violates the structural connection detailing provisions required for n...

Why it matters: Attempting to install 8-inch anchor bolts in a 6-inch slab will result in the bolts blowing out the bottom of the slab or metal decking. This destroys the structural integrity of the anchorage, leaving the columns unanchored against lateral loads, uplift, or overturning, which poses a severe stru...

Suggested next step: Please revise the expansion bolt length to be compatible with the 6-inch concrete slab thickness, or provide detailing for a thickened concrete pier at the column base locations to accommodate the 8-inch bolts.

RFI draft: Please revise the expansion bolt length to be compatible with the 6-inch concrete slab thickness, or provide detailing for a thickened concrete pier at the column base locations to accommodate the 8-inch bolts.

Summary: The general notes specify a "DESIGN LIVE LOAD = 50 PSF." for the observation deck framing plan. Under IEBC Section 304.1, if an approved existing live load is less than that required by IBC Section 1607 (which generally requires 100 PSF for public assembly and observation areas), the area must be explicitly posted with placards indicating the approved nonconforming live load. The drawings omit ...

Why it matters: Observation decks are assembly areas prone to dense crowding. Designing an observation deck for 50 PSF without clear load-limit placards creates a severe risk of structural overloading and potential catastrophic failure during public use.

Suggested next step: Please clarify if the observation deck is an existing element approved for 50 PSF or a newly designed area. If existing, add notes requiring placards to be posted indicating the 50 PSF limit per IEBC 304.1. If new, revise the framing design to support the IBC-required 100 PSF ...

RFI draft: Please clarify if the observation deck is an existing element approved for 50 PSF or a newly designed area. If existing, add notes requiring placards to be posted indicating the 50 PSF limit per IEBC 304.1. If new, revise the framing design to sup...

Summary: FLOOR PLAN NOTES 1 requires a 'CARBON MONOXIDE CONTROL SYSTEM' and 'CARBON MONOXIDE SENSORS', which aligns with the plan tags for a 'CO 1 SENSOR' and the building code requirements for carbon monoxide detection (IEBC 308.1). However, the same note explicitly specifies the installation of 'GVU-2R REMOTE CARBON DIOXIDE SENSORS'. Carbon dioxide (CO2) sensors do not detect carbon monoxide (CO), cre...

Why it matters: Installing CO2 sensors instead of CO sensors in a garage environment is a severe life safety hazard. The control system will fail to detect toxic carbon monoxide buildup from vehicle exhaust, meaning it will not activate the exhaust fans or alarms when needed. This compromises the life safety sys...

Suggested next step: Please revise FLOOR PLAN NOTES 1 to specify Carbon Monoxide (CO) sensors instead of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) sensors for the Toxalert GVU-10 control system, ensuring the system functions as a life safety carbon monoxide detection system as intended.

RFI draft: Please revise FLOOR PLAN NOTES 1 to specify Carbon Monoxide (CO) sensors instead of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) sensors for the Toxalert GVU-10 control system, ensuring the system functions as a life safety carbon monoxide detection system as intended.