Plan Review: 246 Issues Found

Summary: 172 index entries | 81 perfect matches | 8 mismatched | 83 missing Mismatched (8): E101: Expected: ELEVATOR DETAILS (E101) | Actual: ELEVATOR DETAILS (S601)(p74) C1: Expected: PRELIMINARY GRADING PLAN (C1) | Actual: GRADING PLAN FOR: 4970 HOLLY DRIVE (C1)(p11) A907: Expected: ARCHITECTURAL DETAILS (A907) | Actual: ARCHITECTUAL DETAILS (A907)(p53) S100: Expected: L...

Why it matters: Addressing this before construction prevents rework and supports code compliance.

Suggested next step: Review drawings and specifications to resolve before construction.

RFI draft: Please clarify: Drawing Index Audit: 83 missing, 8 mismatched out of 172 sheets

Summary: Detail 15 ("SUSPENSION SYSTEM AT WALL") specifies a "7/8\" CONTINUOUS WALL ANGLE," at the ceiling edge. Additionally, Detail 12 ("CEILING LATERAL FORCE BRACING") requires a "3/4\" (MIN.) CLR. AT FREE SIDES". Providing a 7/8-inch wall angle with a minimum 3/4-inch clearance leaves only a 1/8-inch bearing seat for the ceiling grid. This contradicts ASCE 7-16 Section C13.5.6.2.2, which establishes...

Why it matters: The specified 7/8-inch angle combined with the required 3/4-inch clearance leaves an extremely small bearing seat (1/8 inch) for the ceiling grid at the free ends. During a seismic event, the ceiling grid will easily exceed this minimal bearing, causing the runners to slip off the wall angle. Thi...

Suggested next step: Please revise Detail 15 and associated details to specify a minimum 2-in. perimeter closure wall angle at the ceiling free ends to comply with ASCE 7-16 Section C13.5.6.2.2 requirements for seismically braced suspended ceilings, and verify bearing seat dimensions at the cleara...

RFI draft: Please revise Detail 15 and associated details to specify a minimum 2-in. perimeter closure wall angle at the ceiling free ends to comply with ASCE 7-16 Section C13.5.6.2.2 requirements for seismically braced suspended ceilings, and verify bearing...

Summary: The seismic design notes indicate a two-stage analysis procedure, with the superstructure having an R-value of 6.5 and an unamplified base shear of 223.01 kips, and the lower podium structure having an R-value of 5.0. Under ASCE 7 Sections 12.2.3.1 and 12.2.3.2(d), because the lower system has a lower R-value, the forces transferred from the upper system must be amplified by the ratio of the hi...

Why it matters: If the lower podium structure and its foundations are designed using a total base shear of only 238.55 kips, the seismic force-resisting elements will be severely under-designed. The podium must be designed to resist its own inertial forces plus the amplified reactions from the superstructure. Fa...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the reported Base Shear of 238.55 kips for the Podium Structure. Per ASCE 7 Section 12.2.3.1, reactions from the superstructure (R=6.5) transferred to the podium (R=5.0) must be amplified by the ratio of R_upper/R_lower (1.3). The amplified superstructure base s...

RFI draft: Please clarify the reported Base Shear of 238.55 kips for the Podium Structure. Per ASCE 7 Section 12.2.3.1, reactions from the superstructure (R=6.5) transferred to the podium (R=5.0) must be amplified by the ratio of R_upper/R_lower (1.3). The a...

Summary: Detail 14 shows a CMU wall anchored to a wood floor assembly using 5/8" diameter threaded rods at 24" O.C. embedded into the wall and attached to a 3x12 PTDF wood ledger. The detail relies on the boundary nailing ("B.N.") of the plywood sheathing and the 2x6 joists with 'HU' hangers to transfer the out-of-plane wall anchorage forces from the ledger to the floor diaphragm. This configuration imp...

Why it matters: ASCE 7-16 Section 12.11.2.2.3 explicitly prohibits the use of wood ledgers in cross-grain bending or cross-grain tension for the anchorage of concrete or masonry structural walls to wood diaphragms. It also explicitly states that diaphragm sheathing shall not be considered effective for providing...

Suggested next step: Please revise Detail 14 to provide an approved positive mechanical anchorage system (such as embedded straps or hold-down connectors) that connects the CMU wall directly to the floor joists or blocking to provide continuous ties into the diaphragm without inducing cross-grain ...

RFI draft: Please revise Detail 14 to provide an approved positive mechanical anchorage system (such as embedded straps or hold-down connectors) that connects the CMU wall directly to the floor joists or blocking to provide continuous ties into the diaphragm...

Summary: Detail 14 (S06FLR111A_I/12) shows a wood floor diaphragm anchored to a concrete wall. The detail specifies a '3 1/2" PSL LEDGER w/ 5/8"ø ANCHORS @ 24" O.C.' attached to the wall, and the joists are supported by 'SIMP. IUS HANGER AT LEDGER'. Because there is no independent tension tie connecting the joists directly to the concrete wall, out-of-plane wall anchorage forces rely entirely on the han...

Why it matters: Subjecting wood framing members to cross-grain tension is highly susceptible to sudden, brittle failure during a seismic event because wood has very low tensile strength perpendicular to the grain. This can lead to the ledger splitting and completely severing the out-of-plane wall anchorage, whic...

Suggested next step: Please revise Detail 14 to include an independent out-of-plane wall anchorage connection (such as embedded strap ties or tension ties like DTT2/HTT4 attached directly to the floor joists and the concrete wall) that bypasses the ledger, eliminating cross-grain tension in compli...

RFI draft: Please revise Detail 14 to include an independent out-of-plane wall anchorage connection (such as embedded strap ties or tension ties like DTT2/HTT4 attached directly to the floor joists and the concrete wall) that bypasses the ledger, eliminating...

Summary: Detail 5 S06TJI042C_I / 12 shows an exterior guardrail stanchion attached to a "4x RIM BEAM", which connects to "2x4 @ 24\" O.C." deck joists that frame into a "2x4 LEDGER" via a "SIMPSON 'LU' HANGER". A 200 lb outward lateral load on the guardrail generates outward tension on the deck joists. The detail fails to provide a positive mechanical tie across the wall interface to the interior struct...

Why it matters: Failing to provide a continuous load path with a positive tension connection for the deck guardrail loads creates a severe collapse hazard. Nail withdrawal in a face-mount hanger is structurally insufficient to resist the moments generated by the guardrail concentrated load, directly violating th...

Suggested next step: Provide a positive mechanical tension tie (e.g., hold-down anchor or tension strap) connecting the exterior deck framing directly to the interior floor diaphragm or the "CONT. LVL" to safely transfer outward guardrail forces into the main structure.

RFI draft: Provide a positive mechanical tension tie (e.g., hold-down anchor or tension strap) connecting the exterior deck framing directly to the interior floor diaphragm or the "CONT. LVL" to safely transfer outward guardrail forces into the main structure.

Summary: Details 12 and 13 depict roof/floor framing connections to concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls that rely on wood nailers to transfer out-of-plane seismic forces. In Detail 12, a "TRUSS PER PLAN" is attached to a "3x NAILER" using a "THA HGR". Without a dedicated embedded strap, out-of-plane forces place the hanger's nails in withdrawal and the nailer in cross-grain tension. Similarly, in Detail 1...

Why it matters: ASCE 7-16 Section 12.11.2.2.3 strictly prohibits the use of wood ledgers or framing in cross-grain bending or cross-grain tension for the anchorage of concrete or masonry structural walls to wood diaphragms. It also prohibits anchorage accomplished by nails subject to withdrawal. Relying on the w...

Suggested next step: Please revise Details 12 and 13 to provide direct out-of-plane wall anchorage that bypasses the wood nailers, such as embedding strap ties (e.g., Simpson PATM or similar, as correctly shown in Details 14 and 16) directly into the CMU wall and connecting them to the diaphragm f...

RFI draft: Please revise Details 12 and 13 to provide direct out-of-plane wall anchorage that bypasses the wood nailers, such as embedding strap ties (e.g., Simpson PATM or similar, as correctly shown in Details 14 and 16) directly into the CMU wall and conn...

Summary: The Project Information notes indicate the proposed building has '5 STORIES ABOVE PARKING' with a construction type of 'TYPE IIIB'. However, the same note acknowledges that the maximum allowable number of stories per CBC Table 504.4 is 4. According to CBC Section 504.4, the maximum number of stories above grade plane must not exceed the limits specified in Table 504.4. While the project uses th...

Why it matters: Exceeding the maximum allowable number of stories for a specific construction type is a major fire and life safety violation. To construct 5 stories above the Type IA podium, the building must either be redesigned to comply with the 4-story limit, or the construction type must be upgraded (e.g., ...

Suggested next step: Please clarify how the proposed 5 stories above the parking structure comply with the CBC Table 504.4 allowable story limits for Type IIIB construction. Will the construction type be upgraded (e.g., to Type IIIA) to permit 5 stories, or will the design be revised to a maximum ...

RFI draft: Please clarify how the proposed 5 stories above the parking structure comply with the CBC Table 504.4 allowable story limits for Type IIIB construction. Will the construction type be upgraded (e.g., to Type IIIA) to permit 5 stories, or will the d...

Summary: The Code Analysis explicitly states that the allowable number of stories for Type IIIB construction is 4 per CBC Table 504.4, but lists the actual number of stories as 5. CBC Section 504.4 requires that the building height and number of stories shall not exceed the limits specified in Table 504.4.

Why it matters: Constructing a 5-story building where only 4 stories are permitted by the construction type is a major life-safety and structural violation. This will result in plan check rejection and necessitates either reducing the building height by one story, or changing the construction type to one that pe...

Suggested next step: Please address the discrepancy between the allowable 4 stories and the actual 5 stories. Will the building be redesigned to a different construction type, or will a story be removed to comply with CBC Section 504.4?

RFI draft: Please address the discrepancy between the allowable 4 stories and the actual 5 stories. Will the building be redesigned to a different construction type, or will a story be removed to comply with CBC Section 504.4?

Summary: The Code Analysis on sheet TS002 indicates the building has an "ACTUAL NUMBER OR STORIES: 5" and specifies the "INTERIOR STAIR ENCLOSURES" are designed as a "1-HR FIRE BARRIER". However, CBC Section 1023.2 explicitly requires interior exit stairway enclosures to have a fire-resistance rating of not less than 2 hours when connecting four or more stories. Because this stairway connects a 5-story ...

Why it matters: Providing only a 1-hour stair enclosure in a 5-story building critically compromises the protected means of egress, posing a severe life safety risk to occupants during a fire. This will result in an immediate plan check failure by the building department and fire marshal, requiring architectural...

Suggested next step: Please revise the Code Analysis to specify a minimum 2-hour fire-resistance rating for the interior stair enclosures in accordance with CBC Section 1023.2, and verify that all affected wall types and structural layouts are updated accordingly.

RFI draft: Please revise the Code Analysis to specify a minimum 2-hour fire-resistance rating for the interior stair enclosures in accordance with CBC Section 1023.2, and verify that all affected wall types and structural layouts are updated accordingly.

Summary: The civil grading plan indicates that the proposed exterior concrete paving at the building entrances is set higher than the interior floor elevations. At the Lobby entrance, the interior spot elevation is 177.6, while the exterior finish surface (FS) immediately outside is FS 177.69. This creates a change in level of 0.09 feet (1.08 inches). At the Trash room, the interior elevation is 177.3 a...

Why it matters: The California Building Code limits abrupt changes in level along any accessible route, including doorways, to a maximum of 1/2 inch. The elevation differences of 1.08 and 1.56 inches constitute severe accessibility barriers that violate CBC Section 1111A.1. Furthermore, setting the exterior grad...

Suggested next step: Please review the coordination between the architectural finished floor elevations (FFE) and the civil grading plan. Revise the grading or raise the building FFE so that the exterior landing is level with, or a maximum of 1/2-inch below, the interior floor. This is required to...

RFI draft: Please review the coordination between the architectural finished floor elevations (FFE) and the civil grading plan. Revise the grading or raise the building FFE so that the exterior landing is level with, or a maximum of 1/2-inch below, the inter...

Summary: The drawing title 'LEVEL 3, 4 AND 5 FLOOR PLAN' and stairway notes ('STAIR 2 UP DN') indicate the building and its interior exit stairways connect at least five stories. The provided LEGEND only includes symbols for a '1-HR FIRE RATED SHAFT' and a '1-HR FIRE RATED WALL', lacking any 2-hour fire-resistance rated assembly type. According to CBC Section 1023.2, interior exit stairway enclosures th...

Why it matters: Using a 1-hour fire-resistance rated enclosure for stairways connecting 4 or more stories severely compromises the primary means of egress in a fire event. This will result in a failed building permit review and requires architectural plan revisions to specify thicker 2-hour rated wall assemblies...

Suggested next step: Please confirm that STAIR 1 and STAIR 2 require a 2-hour fire-resistance rating as they connect 4 or more stories. Update the Legend to include a 2-hour rated shaft symbol and adjust the stairway enclosure details and floor plan accordingly.

RFI draft: Please confirm that STAIR 1 and STAIR 2 require a 2-hour fire-resistance rating as they connect 4 or more stories. Update the Legend to include a 2-hour rated shaft symbol and adjust the stairway enclosure details and floor plan accordingly.

Summary: The drawing for the 'LEVEL 6 FLOOR PLAN' includes an 'ELEVATOR' shaft. However, the architectural legend only provides a symbol for a '1-HR FIRE RATED SHAFT' and omits any provision or symbol for a 2-hour rated shaft. According to CBC Section 713.4, shaft enclosures connecting four stories or more must have a fire-resistance rating of not less than 2 hours. CBC Section 713.14 mandates that elev...

Why it matters: If constructed with only a 1-hour fire-resistance rating, the elevator shaft will fail to provide adequate fire and smoke compartmentation for a mid-rise building, leading to severe life safety risks. This will result in plan check rejection or require extremely costly structural and architectura...

Suggested next step: Please update the partition schedule and legend to include a 2-hour fire-rated shaft assembly. Verify that all elevator and other shaft enclosures connecting four or more stories are graphically tagged with the 2-hour rating to comply with CBC Section 713.4.

RFI draft: Please update the partition schedule and legend to include a 2-hour fire-rated shaft assembly. Verify that all elevator and other shaft enclosures connecting four or more stories are graphically tagged with the 2-hour rating to comply with CBC Sec...

Summary: General Note G specifies that all patios and balconies shall slope to drain at a "MINIMUM 1/4"/FOOT". However, CBC Section 11B-403.3 requires that the cross slope of walking surfaces on accessible routes shall not be steeper than 1:48, which is exactly mathematically equivalent to 1/4" per foot. By specifying the absolute code maximum as a "minimum" requirement, the drawings instruct the contra...

Why it matters: If concrete contractors follow the note and slope the patios or balconies steeper than 1/4" per foot (to ensure they meet the "minimum" drainage requirement), the surfaces will fail accessibility inspections. Fixing this post-pour requires extremely costly demolition and replacement of the concre...

Suggested next step: Revise General Note G to state that patios and balconies shall slope to drain at a "MAXIMUM 1/4"/FOOT" (or "MAXIMUM 2%") to ensure compliance with the accessibility cross slope limits while providing drainage.

RFI draft: Revise General Note G to state that patios and balconies shall slope to drain at a "MAXIMUM 1/4"/FOOT" (or "MAXIMUM 2%") to ensure compliance with the accessibility cross slope limits while providing drainage.

Summary: The West Elevation drawing indicates an exterior balcony (Keynote 3) on the left side of the building projecting outward to Grid line 0.1, which is explicitly labeled as the 'PROPERTY LINE'. According to CBC Section 705.2 and Table 705.2, exterior balconies and similar projections must maintain a minimum distance from the line used to determine the fire separation distance (the property line). ...

Why it matters: Constructing an exterior balcony directly up to the property line poses a severe fire spread hazard to adjacent lots and buildings. This will result in immediate plan check failure, requiring the facade and balcony structure to be redesigned and set back to maintain at least the required 24 inche...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the exact dimension of the balcony projection relative to Grid 0.1. Redesign the exterior balconies on the left edge of the building to be set back a minimum of 24 inches from the property line, or further as mandated by CBC Table 705.2 based on the actual Fire ...

RFI draft: Please clarify the exact dimension of the balcony projection relative to Grid 0.1. Redesign the exterior balconies on the left edge of the building to be set back a minimum of 24 inches from the property line, or further as mandated by CBC Table 7...