Plan Review: 380 Issues Found

Summary: 190 index entries | 51 perfect matches | 5 mismatched | 134 missing Mismatched (5): T5.0: Expected: ENLARGED UNIT PLANS (T5.0) | Actual: ENLARGED UNIT PLANS (A8.1)(p38) T5.1: Expected: ENLARGED UNIT PLANS (T5.1) | Actual: ENLARGED UNIT PLANS (A8.1)(p38) S3.00: Expected: BUILDING SECTIONS (S3.00) | Actual: BUILDING SECTIONS (A4.1)(p23) S3.01: Expected: BUILDING SEC...

Why it matters: Addressing this before construction prevents rework and supports code compliance.

Suggested next step: Review drawings and specifications to resolve before construction.

RFI draft: Please clarify: Drawing Index Audit: 134 missing, 5 mismatched out of 190 sheets

Summary: The Level P2 Code Plan contains a note stating 'LEVEL P2 (MEZZANINE) IS CONSIDERED A STORY PER IBC 505 AND IS TO BE TREATED AS A SEPARATE STORY FOR ALL IBC CALCULATIONS.' This directly contradicts IBC 505.2, which dictates that a mezzanine 'shall be considered a portion of the story below' and 'shall not contribute to either the building area or number of stories'. Furthermore, the Level 1 Occu...

Why it matters: Treating a level as a separate story while simultaneously labeling it a mezzanine under IBC 505 invalidates the building height and area calculations. A level must strictly comply with mezzanine area limitations to be exempt from being counted as a story. Alternatively, if it is classified as a f...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the classification of Level P2. If it is intended to be a separate story, remove references to IBC 505 and the term 'MEZZANINE' from the drawings. If it is intended to be a mezzanine, revise the design so its area complies with the limitations in IBC 505.2.1 and...

RFI draft: Please clarify the classification of Level P2. If it is intended to be a separate story, remove references to IBC 505 and the term 'MEZZANINE' from the drawings. If it is intended to be a mezzanine, revise the design so its area complies with the ...

Summary: The Interior Wall Type Schedule lists wall type M69 with a 2-hour fire rating per UL U419. However, the assembly description is nonsymmetrical, specifying two layers of 5/8" gypsum board on one side but only a single layer of 5/8" gypsum board on the opposite side. IBC 703.2.1.1 requires that the assigned fire-resistance rating of nonsymmetrical walls be the shortest duration obtained from test...

Why it matters: Building a wall intended as a 2-hour fire barrier with only one layer of 5/8" gypsum board on one side will fail to provide the required fire separation, posing a severe life safety risk. This will result in failed inspections, tear-down, and reconstruction of the affected walls.

Suggested next step: Please clarify if the description for wall type M69 contains a typo. Provide an updated assembly description that meets the UL U419 requirements for a 2-hour fire-resistance rating (typically requiring two layers of 5/8" Type X gypsum board on both sides).

RFI draft: Please clarify if the description for wall type M69 contains a typo. Provide an updated assembly description that meets the UL U419 requirements for a 2-hour fire-resistance rating (typically requiring two layers of 5/8" Type X gypsum board on bot...

Summary: Details F2 and F5 show spray-applied polyurethane foam plastic insulation on the underside of a concrete deck/podium lid. The drawings indicate an acoustical ceiling tile (ACT) system hung underneath the insulation. IBC 2603.4 requires that foam plastic insulation be separated from the interior of a building by an approved thermal barrier, such as 1/2-inch gypsum wallboard or a material tested ...

Why it matters: Exposed foam plastic in a ceiling plenum creates a severe fire and life safety hazard. Without a proper thermal barrier or an intumescent fire-resistant coating, fire can spread rapidly across the surface of the foam, producing highly toxic smoke and leading to structural failure. This will resul...

Suggested next step: Please revise Details F2 and F5 to include an approved thermal barrier separating the spray foam insulation from the interior space. Clarify whether an intumescent fire-resistant coating tested to NFPA 275 will be applied to the foam, or if a 1/2-inch gypsum wallboard ceiling ...

RFI draft: Please revise Details F2 and F5 to include an approved thermal barrier separating the spray foam insulation from the interior space. Clarify whether an intumescent fire-resistant coating tested to NFPA 275 will be applied to the foam, or if a 1/2-...

Summary: The floor plan shows two horizontal corridors (CIRCULATION 220 and CIRCULATION 221) that each serve as the only egress path for multiple eastern residential units. Both corridors start at stairwells on the west side (North Stair N-200 and South Stair SS-200 respectively) and extend eastward to end at unit doors without a secondary exit or cross-corridor connection. Dimensional strings on the ex...

Why it matters: Section 1020.5 restricts the length of dead-end corridors in sprinklered Group R-2 occupancies to a maximum of 50 feet. Exceeding this length forces occupants at the far ends of the corridors to travel too long a distance in a single direction to reach an exit, which is a major life safety hazard...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the egress strategy for the eastern ends of corridors CIRCULATION 220 and CIRCULATION 221. Will an additional exit stairway be incorporated on the east side, or will the corridors be connected to eliminate the dead-end condition and comply with the 50-foot limit...

RFI draft: Please clarify the egress strategy for the eastern ends of corridors CIRCULATION 220 and CIRCULATION 221. Will an additional exit stairway be incorporated on the east side, or will the corridors be connected to eliminate the dead-end condition and...

Summary: The roof plan shows primary drainage consisting of scuppers ("SCUPPER, CONDUCTOR HEAD, AND DOWNSPOUT") that direct water into the "COURTYARD BELOW". The roof perimeter is enclosed by parapet walls, as indicated by Note 1 and the inward roof slope. However, there are no secondary (emergency overflow) scuppers or roof drains shown. IBC 1502.2 requires secondary drainage where perimeter constructi...

Why it matters: If the primary scuppers become clogged by debris, the lack of secondary overflow drainage will cause rainwater to pool across the fully parapeted roof. This entrapped water can quickly exceed the roof's structural rain load design capacity, presenting a severe risk of structural collapse and exte...

Suggested next step: Please revise the roof plan to include secondary (emergency overflow) scuppers or roof drains, sized and elevated appropriately to prevent hazardous water buildup in accordance with IBC 1502.2 and 1611.1.

RFI draft: Please revise the roof plan to include secondary (emergency overflow) scuppers or roof drains, sized and elevated appropriately to prevent hazardous water buildup in accordance with IBC 1502.2 and 1611.1.

Summary: The West Elevation depicts an exterior stair system explicitly designated as a means of egress ("ALLEY EGRESS EXIT"). This stair is shown passing directly by exterior wall windows (labeled "W-5"). According to IBC Section 1027.6, exterior exit stairways must be separated from the interior of the building, and openings in the separation wall are strictly "limited to those necessary for egress fr...

Why it matters: Allowing non-egress openings such as standard windows adjacent to an exterior exit stairway compromises the required fire separation. In the event of a fire, flames or smoke could breach these windows, rapidly filling the exterior egress path and preventing occupants from safely evacuating. This ...

Suggested next step: Please revise the West Elevation design to remove the non-egress windows (W-5) located along the Alley Egress exterior stairway to ensure proper fire separation per IBC Section 1027.6, or provide documentation demonstrating that an approved exception applies.

RFI draft: Please revise the West Elevation design to remove the non-egress windows (W-5) located along the Alley Egress exterior stairway to ensure proper fire separation per IBC Section 1027.6, or provide documentation demonstrating that an approved except...

Summary: The W/E BUILDING SECTION displays a dimension of "38'-0\" MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEIGHT TO ROOF" extending from the podium level datum (5723') up to the ROOF LEVEL (142'-0"). However, under IBC 510.2, a horizontal building separation allowance considers the portions as separate buildings only for area limitations, continuity of fire walls, limitation of number of stories, and type of construction. I...

Why it matters: Measuring allowable building height from the podium deck rather than the grade plane is a critical code analysis error. This means the building exceeds its allowable height by 5'-0", which will lead to a rejection of the building permit unless the construction type is changed, a special variance ...

Suggested next step: Confirm the allowable building height in feet based on the construction type per IBC Table 504.3. Update the code analysis and building sections to measure the total building height in feet from the grade plane, ensuring the 43'-0" actual height does not exceed the maximum all...

RFI draft: Confirm the allowable building height in feet based on the construction type per IBC Table 504.3. Update the code analysis and building sections to measure the total building height in feet from the grade plane, ensuring the 43'-0" actual height d...

Summary: The drawings specify 18 risers (two flights of 9 risers each, shown as 8 treads) to connect the Mezzanine at elevation 109'-0" and the Second Floor at elevation 121'-0". Spanning this 12-foot (144-inch) floor-to-floor height with exactly 18 risers requires an actual riser height of 8.0 inches. This directly violates IBC Section 1011.5.2, which restricts maximum stair riser heights to 7 inches. ...

Why it matters: If constructed according to the specified number of risers, the stair will either have 8-inch risers (a severe code violation and tripping hazard) or it will fall 22 inches short of the Second Floor landing. Rectifying this requires adding at least 3 more risers (for a total of 21 risers at ~6.85...

Suggested next step: Please review the stair design and vertical geometry between the Mezzanine (109'-0") and Second Floor (121'-0"). The 12-foot elevation difference requires at least 21 risers to comply with the 7-inch maximum riser height, but the plans and section currently show only 18 risers...

RFI draft: Please review the stair design and vertical geometry between the Mezzanine (109'-0") and Second Floor (121'-0"). The 12-foot elevation difference requires at least 21 risers to comply with the 7-inch maximum riser height, but the plans and section...

Summary: The Door Schedule specifies 45-minute (45M) and 20-minute (20M) fire ratings for numerous doors throughout the building (e.g., Door 100B and Door 106). However, the schedule assigns these fire-rated doors to Hardware Groups 4 and 6. The Door Hardware Groups schedule specifies only butt hinges, locksets, and stops/sweeps for Groups 4 and 6, completely omitting an overhead closer or any other sel...

Why it matters: If fire-rated doors (such as unit entries and mechanical rooms) are installed without closing devices, they can easily be left open by occupants, destroying the integrity of the fire barrier. This prevents the compartmentalization of fire and smoke, presenting a severe life-safety risk and ensuri...

Suggested next step: Please revise the Door Schedule or the Door Hardware Groups to ensure that all fire-rated doors (including those assigned to Groups 4 and 6) are equipped with a UL-listed self-closing device, such as an overhead closer or approved spring hinges, in order to comply with NFPA 80...

RFI draft: Please revise the Door Schedule or the Door Hardware Groups to ensure that all fire-rated doors (including those assigned to Groups 4 and 6) are equipped with a UL-listed self-closing device, such as an overhead closer or approved spring hinges, i...

Summary: The FIRST FLOOR FINISH PLAN indicates that the South Stair (S-100) originates or lands at this level, as denoted by the 'UP' arrow on the stair treads. The exterior walls enclosing the stairwell at the corner of the building are depicted as solid, continuous boundaries with no exterior exit doors. The only visible door to the stairwell opens directly into the interior Parking Garage space.

Why it matters: Per IBC Sections 1023.1 and 1023.3, interior exit stairways must lead directly to the exterior of the building (exit discharge) or be extended to the exterior via a fire-resistance-rated exit passageway. Discharging an exit stairway directly into a parking garage violates termination requirements...

Suggested next step: Please revise the ground floor layout for South Stair (S-100) to include a direct exit door to the exterior, or provide a rated exit passageway connecting the stair enclosure to the exterior in compliance with IBC 1023.1 and 1023.3.

RFI draft: Please revise the ground floor layout for South Stair (S-100) to include a direct exit door to the exterior, or provide a rated exit passageway connecting the stair enclosure to the exterior in compliance with IBC 1023.1 and 1023.3.

Summary: The Steel Column Schedule specifies column C1 as an HSS6x6x1/4 using base plate BP2. The Base Plate Schedule defines BP2 as Plate Type 2 with dimensions of 10" (L) by 10" (W). The Base Plate Type 2 detail illustrates the column centered along the 'L' dimension (indicated by 'EQ' 'EQ') with anchor bolts placed at a '1 1/2", TYP' edge distance. For a 10" long plate and a 6" wide column centered u...

Why it matters: This geometric impossibility violates IBC Section 1603.1, which requires construction documents to accurately show the size, section, and dimensioned relative locations of structural members. During construction, the anchor bolts cast into the concrete foundation will physically clash with the wa...

Suggested next step: Please review the dimensions for BP1, BP2, and BP3 in the Base Plate Schedule relative to the supported column sizes (e.g., HSS6x6 for column C1). A 10"x10" base plate with 1 1/2" typical edge distances places the anchor bolts inside the 6"x6" column profile. Recommend increas...

RFI draft: Please review the dimensions for BP1, BP2, and BP3 in the Base Plate Schedule relative to the supported column sizes (e.g., HSS6x6 for column C1). A 10"x10" base plate with 1 1/2" typical edge distances places the anchor bolts inside the 6"x6" col...

Summary: A structural detail showing a diagonal brace connection provides a fillet weld symbol with a flag, which officially designates a field weld. However, the accompanying text explicitly calls out 'SHOP WELD AT TOP TRACK'.

Why it matters: This contradiction violates IBC Section 2204.1, which mandates that welding details and design conform to referenced standards (such as AWS A2.4 for welding symbols). If the fabricator skips the weld because the symbol indicates a field weld, and the erector skips it because the text states it is...

Suggested next step: Clarify whether the diagonal brace connection to the top track is intended to be a shop weld or a field weld, and update the welding symbol and note so they are consistent.

RFI draft: Clarify whether the diagonal brace connection to the top track is intended to be a shop weld or a field weld, and update the welding symbol and note so they are consistent.

Summary: Keynote 2 dictates to "DO NOTE REMOVE TEMPORARY WALL SHORING PRIOR TO WELD." The typo "NOTE" instead of "NOT" creates a critical directive that instructs the contractor to remove temporary shoring before the delayed post-tension connection is properly welded. This directly violates the code requirement that structures must be constructed to safely support factored loads.

Why it matters: If the contractor literally follows this note and removes the temporary shoring before installing the delayed connection seal welds, the incomplete PT slab connection will fail under its own dead load, leading to a catastrophic structural collapse and severe safety hazards during construction.

Suggested next step: Issue an immediate correction to Keynote 2 replacing "DO NOTE REMOVE" with "DO NOT REMOVE" to prevent a critical construction failure.

RFI draft: Issue an immediate correction to Keynote 2 replacing "DO NOTE REMOVE" with "DO NOT REMOVE" to prevent a critical construction failure.

Summary: Keynote 2 provides instructions for a delayed post-tensioned slab connection but states "DO NOTE REMOVE TEMPORARY WALL SHORING PRIOR TO WELD." This typographical error ("NOTE" instead of "NOT") creates a dangerous and ambiguous instruction that reads as an affirmative command to remove the shoring prior to welding, which directly conflicts with safe construction practices.

Why it matters: If a contractor follows the literal text and removes the temporary shoring before the delayed connection seal welds are installed, the structure will not be able to safely support its loads as required by IBC Section 1604.2. Premature removal of shoring would lead to excessive slab deflection, cr...

Suggested next step: Please confirm that Keynote 2 is intended to read "DO NOT REMOVE TEMPORARY WALL SHORING PRIOR TO WELD" and issue a revised keynote schedule to ensure structural stability is maintained until welding is complete.

RFI draft: Please confirm that Keynote 2 is intended to read "DO NOT REMOVE TEMPORARY WALL SHORING PRIOR TO WELD" and issue a revised keynote schedule to ensure structural stability is maintained until welding is complete.