Plan Review: 379 Issues Found

Summary: 237 index entries | 232 perfect matches | 5 mismatched | 0 missing Mismatched (5): C103: Expected: EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL PLAN (C103) | Actual: EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL PLAN (CATEGORY 4) (C103)(p15) C204: Expected: BACKFLOW PREVENTER DETAIL (C204) | Actual: BACKFLOW PREVENTER PLAN AND PROFILE (C204)(p26) SO01: Expected: GENERAL STRUCTURAL NOTES (SO01) | Act...

Why it matters: Addressing this before construction prevents rework and supports code compliance.

Suggested next step: Review drawings and specifications to resolve before construction.

RFI draft: Please clarify: Drawing Index Audit: 0 missing, 5 mismatched out of 237 sheets

Summary: The architectural building sections define a maximum allowable height of 30 feet, specifically depicting a '30' LINE OF MAX ALLOWABLE HEIGHT' that follows the sloping existing grade. However, the drawings dimension the building mass significantly above this line, explicitly labeling 'MAX BLDG. HEIGHT 39'-11" ABOVE EXIST. GRADE' in Building Section A and 'MAX BLDG. HEIGHT 34'-11" ABOVE EXIST. GR...

Why it matters: Because the site is sloped, the allowable height envelope steps or slopes with the grade. The roof structure remains flat while the grade drops, causing the building to protrude up to 9'-11" above the maximum allowable height plane. This is a critical code violation that will cause plan review re...

Suggested next step: The building sections show the structure exceeding the '30' LINE OF MAX ALLOWABLE HEIGHT' by up to 9'-11" due to the sloping grade. Does the project qualify for an IBC building height increase, or does the architectural profile need to be revised to stay within the allowable 3...

RFI draft: The building sections show the structure exceeding the '30' LINE OF MAX ALLOWABLE HEIGHT' by up to 9'-11" due to the sloping grade. Does the project qualify for an IBC building height increase, or does the architectural profile need to be revised ...

Summary: Details on sheet A403 specify "5/8\" SYNTHETIC STUCCO" applied directly over "GALVANIZED MTL. LATH". Under IBC Section 2512.1, exterior plastering applied over metal lath must be installed with not less than three coats. Specifying a single 5/8" layer of synthetic stucco over metal lath fails to meet the minimum three-coat requirement for exterior plaster assemblies over lath.

Why it matters: Applying a 5/8" synthetic stucco finish directly over metal lath does not comply with the code-mandated three-coat exterior plaster assembly. This improper assembly will result in inadequate weather resistance, structural weakness, and a high risk of cracking and water intrusion, leading to faile...

Suggested next step: Clarify the intended exterior wall finish. If a cement plaster (stucco) system is required, revise the details to specify a minimum three-coat system over the galvanized metal lath per IBC Section 2512.1. If a synthetic stucco (EIFS/DEFS) system is intended, remove the metal l...

RFI draft: Clarify the intended exterior wall finish. If a cement plaster (stucco) system is required, revise the details to specify a minimum three-coat system over the galvanized metal lath per IBC Section 2512.1. If a synthetic stucco (EIFS/DEFS) system i...

Summary: Detail 1 specifies a "1-HOUR RATED ASSEMBLY, UL U415 UL SYSTEM A" above the elevator door opening. However, the detail explicitly calls out only "6\" MTL. FRAMING AS REQUIRED" and "5/8\" GYPSUM BOARD, PAINTED". No fire-resistive material (such as the 1-inch gypsum coreboard required by UL U415 System A) is specified on the interior (shaft) face. Per IBC Section 713.4, shaft enclosures connectin...

Why it matters: Leaving the shaft side of the metal framing unprotected directly exposes the steel studs to a hoistway fire, which will cause premature structural failure of the door header and breach the required 1-hour shaft separation. This violation will result in failed life-safety and fire inspections, nec...

Suggested next step: Please revise Detail 1/A507 to include the required fire-resistive material (e.g., 1-inch gypsum shaftliner coreboard) on the hoistway side of the metal framing, consistent with the UL U415 System A tested assembly requirements, to ensure a complete 1-hour fire-resistance rati...

RFI draft: Please revise Detail 1/A507 to include the required fire-resistive material (e.g., 1-inch gypsum shaftliner coreboard) on the hoistway side of the metal framing, consistent with the UL U415 System A tested assembly requirements, to ensure a comple...

Summary: The drawings specify an "OVERHEAD COILING GRILLE ASSEMBLY W/ MOTOR OPERATOR" installed at the elevator opening within walls designated as a "FIRE-RATED WALL ASSEMBLY" and a "1-HOUR RATED ASSEMBLY, UL U415 UL SYSTEM A". According to IBC Section 3002.1, elevator hoistways must be shaft enclosures. IBC Section 713.7 mandates that openings in shaft enclosures be protected by approved fire door asse...

Why it matters: Specifying a 'grille' instead of a fire-protection-rated coiling door will result in the procurement of a non-rated, open-mesh assembly. This breaches the continuity of the 1-hour fire-rated elevator hoistway separation, failing fire inspections and severely compromising life safety by allowing u...

Suggested next step: Please clarify if the overhead coiling assembly is intended to provide or maintain a fire-resistance rating for the hoistway opening/lobby separation. If so, revise the specification and notes from 'OVERHEAD COILING GRILLE ASSEMBLY' to a fire-protection-rated and smoke-control...

RFI draft: Please clarify if the overhead coiling assembly is intended to provide or maintain a fire-resistance rating for the hoistway opening/lobby separation. If so, revise the specification and notes from 'OVERHEAD COILING GRILLE ASSEMBLY' to a fire-prot...

Summary: Special Inspection Note A states that the special inspector shall be hired by the general contractor. This directly contradicts 2018 IBC Section 1704.2, which mandates that the owner or the owner's authorized agent (other than the contractor) must employ the approved agencies to provide special inspections and tests.

Why it matters: Allowing the general contractor to hire the special inspector creates a conflict of interest that violates the building code. This can lead to the building official rejecting the special inspection reports, which could delay construction, stall progress, or prevent the issuance of a Certificate o...

Suggested next step: Please revise Special Inspection Note A to specify that the owner or the owner's authorized agent will employ the special inspector, ensuring compliance with IBC Section 1704.2.

RFI draft: Please revise Special Inspection Note A to specify that the owner or the owner's authorized agent will employ the special inspector, ensuring compliance with IBC Section 1704.2.

Summary: Detail 4 calls for a "2- 3/4" DIA. AWS ANCHOR BOLT WITH 9" MAX EMBEDMENT, TYP.". First, "AWS" (American Welding Society) is not a valid material specification for anchor bolts, which violates IBC Section 2202.1 requiring proper identification of structural steel grades (e.g., ASTM F1554). Second, specifying a "MAX EMBEDMENT" instead of a minimum embedment fails to mandate the necessary anchorag...

Why it matters: The contractor cannot properly source the material without an ASTM grade, and the lack of a minimum embedment depth poses a severe structural safety risk as the connection to the concrete corbel relies entirely on these anchors.

Suggested next step: Clarify the required ASTM material grade for the 3/4" diameter anchor bolts and revise the embedment note to specify a "MIN EMBEDMENT" rather than a maximum.

RFI draft: Clarify the required ASTM material grade for the 3/4" diameter anchor bolts and revise the embedment note to specify a "MIN EMBEDMENT" rather than a maximum.

Summary: Section 6 details a '3/4" DIA. EXPANSION BOLT WITH 2" MIN. EMBEDMENT' installed into an 'EXIST. STAIR STEP' where the concrete edge is explicitly dimensioned as exactly 2" thick. Installing an expansion anchor to a depth equal to the thickness of the concrete will cause the anchor to pass completely through the element, blowing out the back surface and failing to properly expand or engage. This...

Why it matters: Attempting to install these anchors as drawn will result in immediate concrete breakout, rendering the connection completely ineffective. This creates a critical structural safety hazard, as the steel assembly will not be able to support its intended loads.

Suggested next step: Confirm the required embedment depth and anchor type for the 3/4" diameter expansion bolts in Section 6. The current detail showing a 2" embedment into a 2" thick concrete step is physically impossible without causing blowout. Please revise the detail to provide a feasible anc...

RFI draft: Confirm the required embedment depth and anchor type for the 3/4" diameter expansion bolts in Section 6. The current detail showing a 2" embedment into a 2" thick concrete step is physically impossible without causing blowout. Please revise the de...

Summary: Detail 8/S602 depicts a W18X71 beam supported on an "8" THK. CONC. WALL". The anchorage specifies "2 - 3/4" DIA. STUD BOLTS" which are drawn transversely outside the edges of the beam's bottom flange. A W18X71 beam has a flange width of 7.635 inches. Placing 3/4" diameter anchor bolts outside this flange requires an outer-to-outer bolt width of at least 9 inches, which drastically exceeds the 8...

Why it matters: Without adequate concrete width to embed the anchor bolts, the beam's baseplate cannot be securely attached to the wall. This prevents the safe transfer of factored loads (including shear and uplift) to the foundation, compromising structural stability and directly violating the strength and load...

Suggested next step: Please revise Detail 8/S602 to provide a physically viable anchorage for the W18X71 beam. Consider increasing the concrete wall thickness at the bearing point with a pilaster, detailing an embedded plate that avoids flange interference, or orienting the anchor bolts longitudin...

RFI draft: Please revise Detail 8/S602 to provide a physically viable anchorage for the W18X71 beam. Consider increasing the concrete wall thickness at the bearing point with a pilaster, detailing an embedded plate that avoids flange interference, or orienti...

Summary: Detail 2, 'ELEVATOR LOBBY - LOWER LEVEL FIRE ALARM PLAN', shows visual and audible notification appliances (device 'C' and a wall strobe) but does not include a smoke detector. In contrast, the Level 1 elevator lobby correctly includes a smoke detector.

Why it matters: The building code requires elevators to be provided with Phase I emergency recall operation in accordance with ASME A17.1, which mandates the installation of automatic initiating devices (smoke detectors) in all enclosed elevator lobbies to trigger the recall. Omitting a smoke detector in the low...

Suggested next step: Please revise Detail 2 to add a smoke detector in the lower level elevator lobby to ensure the fire alarm system can automatically initiate Phase I emergency elevator recall from this floor.

RFI draft: Please revise Detail 2 to add a smoke detector in the lower level elevator lobby to ensure the fire alarm system can automatically initiate Phase I emergency elevator recall from this floor.

Summary: The 'FIRE SPRINKLER ELEVATOR LOBBY DETAIL' shows a flow switch ('FZ') located in the upper level elevator lobby connected to the lobby sprinkler heads. The drawing's 'ELEVATOR CONTROL NOTES' (Note 2) and legend explicitly state that this zero-delay flow switch activates the shunt trip relay to de-energize power to the elevator. This violates IBC Section 3005.5, which strictly prohibits the acti...

Why it matters: Activating the shunt trip from a sprinkler located in the elevator lobby will prematurely disable the elevator during a fire event before the fire actually threatens the elevator equipment. This prevents firefighters from utilizing Phase II emergency elevator operations and poses a severe life sa...

Suggested next step: Please revise the fire protection and fire alarm sequence of operations. Ensure the elevator shunt trip relay is only activated by devices (such as heat detectors or sprinkler flow switches) located explicitly within the elevator hoistway, machine room, or control spaces. Remo...

RFI draft: Please revise the fire protection and fire alarm sequence of operations. Ensure the elevator shunt trip relay is only activated by devices (such as heat detectors or sprinkler flow switches) located explicitly within the elevator hoistway, machine...

Summary: Floor plan A101 defines the structural grid spacing in the elevator/vestibule area as 11'-5 1/2" (between vertical grids 2 and 3) and 11'-6 1/2" (between horizontal grids A and B). Callout 1/A904 points to the Overhead Coiling Door located in this specific zone. However, the details on A904 (Plan 1/A904 and Elevation 3/A904) specify the required door opening width as 11'-6 3/4" VIF. The specifi...

Why it matters: This is a critical spatial conflict. The manufacturer cannot fabricate and install an 11'-6 3/4" wide coiling door assembly into a structural bay that is strictly narrower than the door itself. This requires either redesigning the structural grid spacing or reducing the clear opening width of the...

Suggested next step: The opening width for the Overhead Coiling Door is detailed as 11'-6 3/4" VIF on A904, but the maximum grid bay spacing in this area on A101 is only 11'-6 1/2" (and 11'-5 1/2" vertically). Please advise how to adjust the door opening width or structural framing to resolve this...

RFI draft: The opening width for the Overhead Coiling Door is detailed as 11'-6 3/4" VIF on A904, but the maximum grid bay spacing in this area on A101 is only 11'-6 1/2" (and 11'-5 1/2" vertically). Please advise how to adjust the door opening width or stru...

Summary: Exterior Elevations (Sheet A201) and Building Section C (Sheet A302) both depict a raised central roof monitor structure over the Band and Choir Offices. The section cut for '3/A302' is explicitly shown passing vertically through this raised monitor on both sheets. However, the corresponding drawing for Building Section E (Detail 3/A302) depicts a standard flat roof over the 'BAND OFFICE 106' w...

Why it matters: This severe cross-referencing discrepancy leaves the building's massing, roof structural framing, and envelope detailing undefined for the central portion of the building. If Building Section E is followed by the framing or enclosure contractors, the prominent raised roof monitor shown in the ele...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the intended roof profile at Building Section E (Detail 3/A302). Should it include the raised roof monitor shown cutting through the offices in the Exterior Elevations and Building Section C, or is the flat roof at 19'-6" top of parapet correct? Please issue coo...

RFI draft: Please clarify the intended roof profile at Building Section E (Detail 3/A302). Should it include the raised roof monitor shown cutting through the offices in the Exterior Elevations and Building Section C, or is the flat roof at 19'-6" top of par...

Summary: The Roof Plan (A102) indicates cross-references to Building Sections on sheet A302, but the orientations of these callouts directly contradict the grid lines displayed in the actual section details. On the Roof Plan, numeric grids (1-16) run left-to-right, and alphabetical grids (A-G) run top-to-bottom. Callout '1/A302' is located on the right edge pointing right (East), which corresponds to a ...

Why it matters: Because the section markers on the Roof Plan are either mislabeled or pointing in the wrong orthogonal directions, the drawings incorrectly map the building sections to the floor plan geometry. This mismatch will confuse contractors trying to align structural frames, interior room elevations, and...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the correct locations and orientations for the Building Sections on A302. Update the callouts 1/A302, 2/A302, and 3/A302 on the Roof Plan (A102) to correctly match the grid line orientations and spatial cuts of the sections they reference.

RFI draft: Please clarify the correct locations and orientations for the Building Sections on A302. Update the callouts 1/A302, 2/A302, and 3/A302 on the Roof Plan (A102) to correctly match the grid line orientations and spatial cuts of the sections they ref...

Summary: The S100 foundation plan references the Stair 1 detailed sections on S500. Within S500, the 'STAIR 1 DETAILED SECTION' (Detail 3) specifies a '10" THK. CONC. STAIR LANDING' and specifically references Detail 6 for further specifics. However, the blown-up Detail 6 contradicts the section by detailing a '6" THK. CONC. STAIR LANDING'.

Why it matters: A 4-inch difference in landing slab thickness impacts the structural capacity, rebar placement and cover, formwork layout, and vertical dimensional coordination of the stair flights. It must be resolved before concrete pouring to avoid non-compliant stair riser heights or compromised structural i...

Suggested next step: Please confirm the correct concrete slab thickness for the Stair 1 landings. Detail 3/S500 calls out a 10" thick landing, while the referenced Detail 6/S500 details a 6" thick landing.

RFI draft: Please confirm the correct concrete slab thickness for the Stair 1 landings. Detail 3/S500 calls out a 10" thick landing, while the referenced Detail 6/S500 details a 6" thick landing.