Plan Review: 106 Issues Found

Summary: The Area Analysis schedule designates the upper level of the mixing room as an '(N) MEZZANINE MIXING ROOM(H-3)' with an area of 2,970 sq. ft., exactly matching the area of the '(N) 1 ST FLOOR MIXING ROOM AND ELECTRICAL ROOM (H-3)' (2,970 sq. ft.). Furthermore, the floor plan labels this space as a '(N) 2-STORY MIXING ROOM' with a combined area of '(2 x 2,970)=5,940 S.F.'. Under CBC Section 505....

Why it matters: Improperly classifying a full second story as a mezzanine circumvents the building height, number of stories, and allowable area regulations established in CBC Chapter 5. Group H-3 occupancies are strictly limited in allowable stories and area. Failing to accurately classify this level could lead...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the classification of the upper level of the Mixing Room. If intended as a mezzanine, revise the design to reduce its area to comply with the maximum percentage limits of CBC 505.2.1. If intended as a second story, correct the Area Analysis to remove it from the...

RFI draft: Please clarify the classification of the upper level of the Mixing Room. If intended as a mezzanine, revise the design to reduce its area to comply with the maximum percentage limits of CBC 505.2.1. If intended as a second story, correct the Area ...

Summary: The drawing details an open drop from the "1.5 FLOOR" (+9'-10") to the "FIRST FLOOR BELOW", explicitly labeling the open boundary as "EDGE OF SLAB" (Keynote 1). CBC Section 1015.2 requires guards along open-sided walking surfaces, such as mezzanines, that are located more than 30 inches above the floor below. The drawing depicts a single solid line for the slab edge without indicating any guard...

Why it matters: Leaving a mezzanine edge unguarded is a critical life-safety hazard. The design will fail plan review and pose a severe fall risk during and after construction. If not incorporated early, adding edge guards later can cause clashes with nearby equipment, stairs, and structural attachments.

Suggested next step: Please update the floor plan to clearly depict and call out a guard along all open slab edges of the 1.5 Floor/Mezzanine, and provide corresponding structural attachment details to ensure compliance with CBC Section 1015.2.

RFI draft: Please update the floor plan to clearly depict and call out a guard along all open slab edges of the 1.5 Floor/Mezzanine, and provide corresponding structural attachment details to ensure compliance with CBC Section 1015.2.

Summary: Room 203 is classified as 'CLASS 1, DIVISION 1' (Group H). Section 508.2.4 requires Group H occupancies to be separated from all other occupancies. However, the plan specifies Keynote Diamond '2' for the partition separating Room 203 from the adjacent egress corridor/stairs. The legend defines Diamond '2' as an unrated '(N) 4" IMP WALL', rather than a fire-resistance-rated assembly (such as Key...

Why it matters: Specifying an unrated wall for a high-hazard mixing room fails to provide the required fire containment, allowing potential fire or explosion events to easily spread to egress paths and other building areas. This violates CBC Section 508.4 and will lead to plan check rejection.

Suggested next step: Please revise the partition type separating the Upstairs Mix Room (203) from adjacent spaces to a fire-resistance-rated barrier (e.g., Keynote 4) complying with CBC Section 508.4, and update the partition tags and linetypes accordingly.

RFI draft: Please revise the partition type separating the Upstairs Mix Room (203) from adjacent spaces to a fire-resistance-rated barrier (e.g., Keynote 4) complying with CBC Section 508.4, and update the partition tags and linetypes accordingly.

Summary: The 'MIXING EQUIPMENT CONTROL ROOM' (201) and adjacent Room 202 only have egress paths routing into the 'UPSTAIRS MIX ROOM' (203). Room 203 is a hazardous 'CLASS 1, DIVISION 1' space (Group H). CBC Section 1016.2 allows egress to pass through intervening spaces only if they are the 'same or lesser hazard occupancy group'. A control room is a lesser hazard than a Class 1 Div 1 mixing room, makin...

Why it matters: Routing an exit path from a standard occupancy area into an explosion/fire hazard zone forces occupants into a dangerous environment during an emergency. This fundamentally compromises life safety egress requirements and is strictly prohibited.

Suggested next step: Please redesign the egress path from the Mixing Equipment Control Room (201) and Room 202 to exit directly to an egress corridor, stairwell, or the exterior, without requiring occupants to pass through the high-hazard Upstairs Mix Room (203).

RFI draft: Please redesign the egress path from the Mixing Equipment Control Room (201) and Room 202 to exit directly to an egress corridor, stairwell, or the exterior, without requiring occupants to pass through the high-hazard Upstairs Mix Room (203).

Summary: The drawing depicts an interior exit stairway core containing stairs and an open shaft indicated by a rectangle with an "X" (defined as "OPEN TO BELOW"). The internal wall separating the open elevator shaft from the stairway is tagged with diamond keynote 3. According to the legend, diamond 3 denotes a "(N) 6\" METAL STUD WALL" with no indicated fire-resistance rating. Conversely, the exterior ...

Why it matters: Without a fire-resistance-rated barrier, any fire or smoke originating in the elevator shaft can immediately penetrate the adjacent exit stairway, compromising the building's primary means of egress and posing a severe life safety hazard.

Suggested next step: Please clarify if the 6" metal stud wall (Diamond 3) separating the open shaft from the stairwell is intended to be a fire-resistance-rated assembly. If so, update the legend to specify the required fire rating (e.g., 2-HR) and provide the corresponding tested assembly detail.

RFI draft: Please clarify if the 6" metal stud wall (Diamond 3) separating the open shaft from the stairwell is intended to be a fire-resistance-rated assembly. If so, update the legend to specify the required fire rating (e.g., 2-HR) and provide the corresp...

Summary: The south elevation depicts a parapet-enclosed roof area that traps water, but only shows a single new roof drain, scupper, and downspout assembly (Keynote 7). CBC 1502.2 requires secondary (emergency overflow) drains or scuppers wherever the roof perimeter construction extends above the roof. There is no secondary overflow scupper or secondary downspout shown on the elevation to prevent water ...

Why it matters: Omitting secondary emergency overflow drainage is a critical life-safety and structural hazard. If the primary scupper or downspout clogs during heavy rainfall, water will become entrapped by the parapet, potentially exceeding the roof's live load capacity and causing a structural collapse. This ...

Suggested next step: Please update the elevations and roof plans to clearly indicate the location, size, and elevation of secondary (emergency overflow) scuppers or drains for all parapet-enclosed roof areas in compliance with CBC 1502.2.

RFI draft: Please update the elevations and roof plans to clearly indicate the location, size, and elevation of secondary (emergency overflow) scuppers or drains for all parapet-enclosed roof areas in compliance with CBC 1502.2.

Summary: The drawings designate a 'COATING ROOM' connected to Regenerative Thermal Oxidizer (RTO) exhaust ducts, which indicates the room is used for the application of solvent-based flammable finishes and falls under spray room requirements. The finishes specified for this room are FRP-White for walls (Keynote 16) and FRP Tile-White for ceilings (Keynote 18). Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP) is a co...

Why it matters: Applying combustible plastic finishes in a highly hazardous room prone to flammable vapor accumulation creates a severe fire hazard. This will result in immediate plan check rejection by the Fire Marshal and could accelerate fire spread during a hazardous materials incident. A complete redesign o...

Suggested next step: Clarify if the Coating Room operations involve the application of flammable finishes. If so, revise Keynotes 16 and 18 to specify noncombustible interior wall and ceiling finishes (note that aluminum is also prohibited per CBC 416.2.1) to ensure compliance with spray room code...

RFI draft: Clarify if the Coating Room operations involve the application of flammable finishes. If so, revise Keynotes 16 and 18 to specify noncombustible interior wall and ceiling finishes (note that aluminum is also prohibited per CBC 416.2.1) to ensure c...

Summary: Detail 1 requires a "1" EMBED. PLATE TO MATCH BASE PLATE SIZE" located at the bottom of the (18" EMBED) anchor rods. Since the base plate is large (1'-4" by 2'-10"), this creates a massive solid horizontal steel plate suspended inside the 2'-6" MIN. deep concrete slab.

Why it matters: A solid plate of this size will block the downward flow of concrete and aggregate during pouring, inevitably trapping air and creating large voids or honeycombing directly beneath the column anchorage. This violates CBC Section 1808.8.3, which requires concrete to be placed in a manner that secur...

Suggested next step: Revise the anchorage detail to allow concrete consolidation. Replace the solid, matching-size embed plate with individual heavy washers, an embedment ring, or a template plate with a large central cutout.

RFI draft: Revise the anchorage detail to allow concrete consolidation. Replace the solid, matching-size embed plate with individual heavy washers, an embedment ring, or a template plate with a large central cutout.

Summary: The legend definitions for keynotes 6 and 8 completely contradict each other between the Overall Proposed Site Plan (A001) and Enlarged Site Plan (A002). On A001, Keynote 8 designates a new fire apparatus access road and Keynote 6 denotes relocated parking stalls. However, on A002, Keynote 8 denotes existing landscape, and Keynote 6 instructs the removal of equipment to relocate parking.

Why it matters: Having conflicting definitions for the same keynote integer within the drawing set creates severe confusion. Keynote 8 is particularly critical because it mixes up a life-safety requirement (fire apparatus access road) with a landscaping feature. Depending on which sheet the contractor or fire in...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the correct definitions for Keynotes 6 and 8. Update the keynote legends across all site plan sheets to be identical, and verify that the keynote symbols placed on the drawings correctly correspond to the intended definition.

RFI draft: Please clarify the correct definitions for Keynotes 6 and 8. Update the keynote legends across all site plan sheets to be identical, and verify that the keynote symbols placed on the drawings correctly correspond to the intended definition.

Summary: Architectural drawing A152 locates new mechanical equipment (e.g., Chillers "07" and Cooling Towers "06") on newly constructed elevated roofs marked as "LOWER TOWER ROOF 40'-7"" and "(N) TREATER #B UPPER TOWER ROOF 71'-0"". However, Structural drawing S421 shows the footprints and ductwork for this exact mechanical equipment overlaid directly onto the existing 23'-6" main building roof. S421 on...

Why it matters: If the structural engineer assumes the new equipment mounts directly to the existing 23'-6" roof, the necessary steel framing and dunnage for the 40'-7" and 71'-0" tower elevations will be entirely missing from the structural package. Conversely, if the equipment is intended to sit at 23'-6", the...

Suggested next step: Clarify the intended mounting elevations and structural support for the new mechanical equipment (Chillers, Cooling Towers). Provide structural framing plans and dunnage details for the new "LOWER TOWER ROOF 40'-7"" and "UPPER TOWER ROOF 71'-0"", or update architectural elevat...

RFI draft: Clarify the intended mounting elevations and structural support for the new mechanical equipment (Chillers, Cooling Towers). Provide structural framing plans and dunnage details for the new "LOWER TOWER ROOF 40'-7"" and "UPPER TOWER ROOF 71'-0"", ...

Summary: The site plan designates the main building as an "(E) ONE-STORY W/ MEZZANINE CONC. TILT-UP BLDG.". However, the area calculations for the office space identify a "1ST FLR. OFFICE = 6,059 S.F." and a "2ND FLR. OFFICE = 4,871 S.F.". According to CBC Section 505.2.1, the aggregate area of a mezzanine cannot exceed one-third of the floor area of the room or space in which it is located. The 4,871 s...

Why it matters: Misclassifying a two-story building as a one-story building with a mezzanine invalidates the building's overall height and area tabular calculations per Chapter 5. This misclassification can lead to significant non-compliance issues regarding allowable area limits, construction types, fire-resist...

Suggested next step: Please clarify the building's story classification. The "2ND FLR. OFFICE" area (4,871 S.F.) exceeds the allowable one-third area limit to be considered a mezzanine over the "1ST FLR. OFFICE" (6,059 S.F.) per CBC 505.2.1. Revise the building designation to indicate a two-story ...

RFI draft: Please clarify the building's story classification. The "2ND FLR. OFFICE" area (4,871 S.F.) exceeds the allowable one-third area limit to be considered a mezzanine over the "1ST FLR. OFFICE" (6,059 S.F.) per CBC 505.2.1. Revise the building design...

Summary: The "1.5 FLOOR" contains a "MEZZANINE FLOOR" (Keynote 3) and an "UPPER TOWER ABOVE" (Keynote 4) that are fully enclosed by a "3-HR FIRE BARRIER" (Keynote 2). This continuous fire barrier defines a distinct room. Based on the drawing outlines, the mezzanine and equipment platform footprint occupies nearly the entire area inside this enclosure. CBC Section 505.2.1 restricts mezzanine area to one-...

Why it matters: A mezzanine that exceeds area limits must be classified as an additional story. Misclassifying a story as a mezzanine circumvents building height and area regulations (Section 503.1), which impacts the entire structural, egress, and fire-life safety strategy, leading to major permitting delays an...

Suggested next step: Please re-evaluate the size of the mezzanine and equipment platforms within the 3-hour fire barrier enclosure. Either reduce their aggregate footprint to comply with CBC 505.2.1 and 505.2.1.1, or reclassify the 1.5 Floor as an additional story and update the building analysis ...

RFI draft: Please re-evaluate the size of the mezzanine and equipment platforms within the 3-hour fire barrier enclosure. Either reduce their aggregate footprint to comply with CBC 505.2.1 and 505.2.1.1, or reclassify the 1.5 Floor as an additional story and...

Summary: The roof plan specifies a primary storm water drain (Keynote 12) for the "NEW ADDITION ROOF" at an elevation of 29'-5". The plan also indicates a "NEW ADDITION ROOF PARAPET" at an elevation of 33'-5". This creates a 4-foot-high perimeter that will entrap water. However, the plan does not show any secondary (emergency overflow) drains or scuppers. Section 1502.2 requires secondary overflow drain...

Why it matters: If the primary 4" storm drain becomes clogged, the 4-foot parapet will trap a massive volume of water on the roof. The resulting hydrostatic weight would likely exceed the roof's structural live load capacity, leading to a catastrophic structural roof collapse.

Suggested next step: Please update the roof plan to include secondary (emergency overflow) drains or scuppers for the New Addition Roof to prevent entrapment. Ensure their sizing and elevation comply with Section 1502.2 and Chapter 11 of the California Plumbing Code.

RFI draft: Please update the roof plan to include secondary (emergency overflow) drains or scuppers for the New Addition Roof to prevent entrapment. Ensure their sizing and elevation comply with Section 1502.2 and Chapter 11 of the California Plumbing Code.

Summary: The drawings depict a walking surface on the 4th Floor platform (elevation 46'-8") that is adjacent to a large void marked with dashed 'X' patterns. The legend defines these 'X' patterns as "OPEN TO BELOW". The boundary of the walking surface is marked with a dashed line and Keynote 1, which the KEYNOTES schedule defines as "EDGE OF SLAB". There are no guardrails, half-walls, or parapets depict...

Why it matters: CBC Section 1015.2 explicitly requires guards along any open-sided walking surface, including equipment platforms, stairs, and landings, that drops more than 30 inches to the floor or grade below. Omitting a required guardrail presents a severe and immediate fall hazard, violates critical life sa...

Suggested next step: Please update the architectural and structural drawings to detail and specify a compliant guardrail assembly (minimum 42 inches in height) along all open edges of the 4th Floor slab adjacent to the "OPEN TO BELOW" areas, in accordance with CBC Section 1015.2.

RFI draft: Please update the architectural and structural drawings to detail and specify a compliant guardrail assembly (minimum 42 inches in height) along all open edges of the 4th Floor slab adjacent to the "OPEN TO BELOW" areas, in accordance with CBC Sec...

Summary: The exterior elevation drawings show the stucco wall assembly terminating at the finished floor level (F.F.L. -4'-0"). Keynote 13 identifies a weep screed at the base of this wall, and Keynote 9 indicates the adjacent ground surface is concrete asphalt paving. The elevations depict the weep screed terminating completely flush with the F.F.L. -4'-0" line, providing 0 inches of vertical clearance...

Why it matters: The purpose of a weep screed is to allow trapped water within the wall assembly to drain to the exterior. Failing to provide the required 2-inch clearance above the paving will prevent proper drainage and cause the stucco assembly to wick moisture directly from the ground/paving. This will lead t...

Suggested next step: The exterior elevations show the stucco weep screed (Keynote 13) terminating flush with the finished floor level (F.F.L -4'-0") of the concrete asphalt paving (Keynote 9). Please revise the elevations and relevant architectural details to clearly indicate the weep screed is pl...

RFI draft: The exterior elevations show the stucco weep screed (Keynote 13) terminating flush with the finished floor level (F.F.L -4'-0") of the concrete asphalt paving (Keynote 9). Please revise the elevations and relevant architectural details to clearly ...