Bronx NY Plan Review: 231 Issues Found

Summary: The flow diagram shows (E)3' HPS (120 PSIG) being reduced through (E)PRVs to downstream steam labeled LPS(5PSIG). In the PRV station detail shown, no downstream pressure relief/safety valve is indicated on the LPS(5PSIG) side.

Why it matters: If a PRV fails open or is improperly adjusted, the downstream LPS(5PSIG) piping and connected equipment can be exposed to upstream pressure. This presents a significant life-safety and equipment-damage risk and could drive rework if downstream overpressure protection is required but not shown/provided.

Suggested next step: Confirm the required downstream overpressure protection for the LPS(5PSIG) steam system served by the (E)PRVs (e.g., safety/relief valve or other compliant means), and show it on the flow diagram. If IMC 1205.2 is being used as the governing criterion, note that it is written for reduced-pressure hydronic piping systems; confirm applicability...

RFI draft: Confirm the required downstream overpressure protection for the LPS(5PSIG) steam system served by the (E)PRVs (e.g., safety/relief valve or other compliant means), and show it on the flow diagram. If IMC 1205.2 is being used as the governing criterion, note that it is written for...

Summary: In the boiler area, the drawings call out the boiler safety vent piping as running 'UP' ('8' SAFETY VENTS UP'). IMC 2018 requires safety/relief valve discharge to be by gravity; routing the discharge/vent piping upward conflicts with that requirement.

Why it matters: If constructed as indicated, this configuration is likely to be rejected at inspection and could require significant field rework of large-diameter safety vent piping and associated penetrations/supports, creating schedule delay and cost overrun. It also presents a life-safety risk if the safety/relief valve discharge arrangement does not...

Suggested next step: Confirm whether the '8' SAFETY VENTS' are safety/relief valve discharge lines. If so, revise the routing/details to comply with IMC 1006.5 by providing a discharge arrangement that discharges by gravity (and provide the discharge routing/termination detail indicating compliant slope/drainage).

RFI draft: Confirm whether the '8' SAFETY VENTS' are safety/relief valve discharge lines. If so, revise the routing/details to comply with IMC 1006.5 by providing a discharge arrangement that discharges by gravity (and provide the discharge routing/termination detail indicating compliant slope/drainage).

Summary: The steam safety valve discharge detail includes a “FLEXIBLE CONNECTOR” as part of the safety/safety relief valve discharge piping arrangement. IMC requires safety and relief valve discharge pipes to be rigid pipe approved for the system temperature, so a flexible connector in the discharge piping conflicts with IMC requirements.

Why it matters: This is a life-safety and inspection item. If installed as detailed, it can trigger plan review/inspection rejection and require rework to replace the flexible section with rigid, temperature-rated piping, causing cost and schedule impacts.

Suggested next step: Revise the steam safety valve discharge installation detail to eliminate the flexible connector from the safety/safety relief valve discharge piping and specify rigid, temperature-rated piping for the entire discharge run in compliance with IMC 1006.6. Confirm the intended connector location (discharge vs. drip-pan drain) and provide corrected...

RFI draft: Revise the steam safety valve discharge installation detail to eliminate the flexible connector from the safety/safety relief valve discharge piping and specify rigid, temperature-rated piping for the entire discharge run in compliance with IMC 1006.6. Confirm the intended connector location...

Summary: The flow diagram identifies the 'FOR' line as the line 'FROM BOILERS' (i.e., the return). On this same FOR piping, the drawing calls for an automated fuel oil shut-off valve and shows a flowmeter assembly that includes a bypass valve. IMC 2018 prohibits installing valves on fuel-oil return piping.

Why it matters: If constructed as shown, the installation can be rejected at plan review/inspection and require rework to remove/relocate valves and reconfigure the return piping, causing schedule delays and additional cost. Valves on the return can also create unsafe operating conditions if the return path is inadvertently closed.

Suggested next step: Revise the design so no valves are installed on the fuel-oil return piping (FOR) per IMC 1305.4, or provide a code-compliant justification/alternate approved method. Confirm which components currently shown on the FOR line (automated shutoff, flowmeter bypass/isolation valves) will be removed or relocated off the return piping.

RFI draft: Revise the design so no valves are installed on the fuel-oil return piping (FOR) per IMC 1305.4, or provide a code-compliant justification/alternate approved method. Confirm which components currently shown on the FOR line (automated shutoff, flowmeter bypass/isolation valves) will be removed or...

Summary: The boiler room combustion air control diagram includes a combustion-air intake damper (D-1, fail normally closed). However, the written sequence states boiler burner startup is proven only by the MAU fan operation end switch, and does not indicate any interlock that prevents boiler operation when the combustion-air damper is closed. IMC 701.2...

Why it matters: This is a life-safety and code-compliance issue that can prevent boiler startup/commissioning approval and require controls redesign/reprogramming (burner permissive and damper proof logic), causing schedule delay and added cost late in the project.

Suggested next step: Revise and resubmit the boiler combustion-air sequence/wiring to show IMC 701.2 compliance: provide a damper proof-open (end switch) interlock with the boiler firing cycle such that the boiler(s) cannot operate unless required combustion-air damper(s) are proven open (and identify which specific damper end switch(es) are used for the burner...

RFI draft: Revise and resubmit the boiler combustion-air sequence/wiring to show IMC 701.2 compliance: provide a damper proof-open (end switch) interlock with the boiler firing cycle such that the boiler(s) cannot operate unless required combustion-air damper(s) are proven open (and identify which specific...

Summary: AE102 indicates the new SBS modified bitumen roof at the stack cap is installed 'OVER METAL DECK' and calls out '4\' MIN INSULATION AT LOW POINT'. However, AE301 Detail 1 (Typical Roof Assembly) states the substrate is 'EXISTING CONCRETE ROOF DECK TO REMAIN' (with 'EXISTING CONCRETE FILL TO REMAIN') and requires 'RIGID INSULATION, PROVIDE 5...

Why it matters: This affects structural coordination (deck type, attachment method, load capacity) and roofing system performance/energy compliance (minimum insulation thickness/R-value). If built per the wrong substrate or insulation requirement, it can result in failed detailing/fastening, schedule and cost impacts, and potential leakage and code compliance...

Suggested next step: Confirm the correct roof deck substrate at the stack cap/scupper area (metal deck vs existing concrete roof deck) and confirm the governing minimum insulation requirement at the low point (4' min vs 5 1/2' R-30 min). Revise AE301 Typical Roof Assembly and/or AE102 roof notes/detail references so the deck and insulation requirements are...

RFI draft: Confirm the correct roof deck substrate at the stack cap/scupper area (metal deck vs existing concrete roof deck) and confirm the governing minimum insulation requirement at the low point (4' min vs 5 1/2' R-30 min). Revise AE301 Typical Roof Assembly and/or AE102 roof notes/detail references so...

Summary: The roof mechanical piping plan labels the deaerator safety vent as 6'. The specification for the deaerator vessel connections lists the safety valve connection as 8' flanged. A 6' safety vent/penetration conflicts with the specified 8' safety valve connection size.

Why it matters: If the safety valve outlet/vent is reduced below the specified connection size, it can require redesign and rework of the vent piping and roof penetration/curb during construction, and can create a significant safety/compliance risk for the deaerator safety relief discharge arrangement.

Suggested next step: Confirm the required deaerator safety valve outlet size and associated vent piping/roof penetration size. Revise the roof piping plan and referenced details to match the specified 8' safety valve connection (or provide an approved basis for an alternate size).

RFI draft: Confirm the required deaerator safety valve outlet size and associated vent piping/roof penetration size. Revise the roof piping plan and referenced details to match the specified 8' safety valve connection (or provide an approved basis for an alternate size).

Summary: The drawing’s deaerator schedule identifies a Cleaver-Brooks pressurized tray-type deaerator with 20 minutes storage and MAWP 50, and lists required pump steam flow at 5 psig as 15,550 lb/hr. The specification requires an Applied Heat Recovery (A.H.R.) deaerator (Model T-70-3) with 25 minutes storage, design pressure 0.005 psig, operating...

Why it matters: This mismatch can lead to procurement/fabrication of the wrong deaerator (different manufacturer/basis of design), incorrect vessel pressure rating/design intent (pressurized vs near-atmospheric design pressure), and major steam-sizing and performance impacts. Resolving after ordering or installation would likely cause significant schedule...

Suggested next step: Confirm the required deaerator basis of design and performance criteria. Should the drawings be revised to match the specification requirements for Model T-70-3 (A.H.R. supplied), including 25 minutes storage, design pressure 0.005 psig, and required steam flow 3250 lb/hr at 5 psig; or should the specification be revised to accept the...

RFI draft: Confirm the required deaerator basis of design and performance criteria. Should the drawings be revised to match the specification requirements for Model T-70-3 (A.H.R. supplied), including 25 minutes storage, design pressure 0.005 psig, and required steam flow 3250 lb/hr at 5 psig; or should...

Summary: The drawing’s fuel oil pump package schedule includes internal relief valves, stating: '(1) PUMP INTERNAL RELIEF VALVES SET AT 30 PSIG.' The supporting specification directly contradicts this by stating: 'e. Internal Relief Valves: Shall not be provided.' The specification also instead requires discharge pressure relief valves: 'C. Pressure...

Why it matters: Relief/overpressure protection requirements affect equipment selection, safety, and acceptance testing. Providing internal relief valves when they are prohibited (and/or omitting the specified discharge relief valves and setpoint) can result in a noncompliant pump package and field rework.

Suggested next step: Confirm the required overpressure protection configuration for the fuel oil pump package: (1) whether internal relief valves are allowed, and (2) whether discharge pressure relief valves are required at 965 kPa (140 psig) set pressure. Revise the pump package schedule/notes accordingly.

RFI draft: Confirm the required overpressure protection configuration for the fuel oil pump package: (1) whether internal relief valves are allowed, and (2) whether discharge pressure relief valves are required at 965 kPa (140 psig) set pressure. Revise the pump package schedule/notes accordingly.

Summary: The drawing identifies the emergency generator as “BASIS OF DESIGN: CATEPILLAR C13”, but the manufacturer wiring diagrams provided reference “C18PD” (e.g., “C18PD STARTER” and “EXTENSION FOR USE WITH C18PD”). This indicates a mismatch between the generator/engine/controller basis used for the electrical design versus the submitted wiring package.

Why it matters: If the project is actually procuring a C18PD-based unit (per the submitted wiring diagrams), the generator control/engine interface wiring requirements and connection points used in design may not match the installed equipment, creating a high risk of incorrect conduit/wiring scope, terminations, testing/commissioning failures, and change orders.

Suggested next step: Confirm the exact generator engine/controller model being furnished (C13 vs C18PD) and provide the correct manufacturer wiring diagrams for the awarded unit. If C18PD (or other) is correct, revise the electrical drawings/one-lines/connection notes to align with the submitted wiring.

RFI draft: Confirm the exact generator engine/controller model being furnished (C13 vs C18PD) and provide the correct manufacturer wiring diagrams for the awarded unit. If C18PD (or other) is correct, revise the electrical drawings/one-lines/connection notes to align with the submitted wiring.

Summary: In the architectural enlarged generator plan, the dimension shown adjacent to the generator layout is '11'-6\''. The generator submittal for 'INSTALLATION-COMPOSITE C13 OPEN W/ WIDE BASE' lists '4625.0 [182.09] OVERALL LENGTH', which conflicts with the drawing’s dimensioned generator footprint/space planning.

Why it matters: If the generator installed matches the submittal overall length, the room layout, equipment pad, and required service/access clearances shown on the drawings may be insufficient, creating installation and maintenance access conflicts and potential rework of walls/doors/louvers and adjacent equipment placement.

Suggested next step: Confirm the exact generator model and overall dimensions that must be accommodated. If the submittal dimensions govern, revise the enlarged generator plan and any affected architectural/mechanical layouts to reflect the correct generator footprint and required clearances (including pad sizing and door/louver positioning).

RFI draft: Confirm the exact generator model and overall dimensions that must be accommodated. If the submittal dimensions govern, revise the enlarged generator plan and any affected architectural/mechanical layouts to reflect the correct generator footprint and required clearances (including pad sizing...

Summary: 237 index entries | 1 perfect matches | 230 mismatched | 6 missing Mismatched (230): PD121.A: Expected: DEMOLITION PLAN LOWER MEZZANINE, AREA A | Actual: PLUMBING DEMOLITION PLAN LOWER MEZZANINE, AREA A (p75) PD121.B: Expected: DEMOLITION PLAN LOWER MEZZANINE, AREA B | Actual: PLUMBING DEMOLITION PLAN LOWER MEZZANINE, AREA B...

Why it matters:

Suggested next step:

RFI draft: 📄 MT601 Schedule Text: DRAWING INDEX — page 109 --- 📄 GI001 Schedule Text: DRAWING INDEX — page 1

Summary: The sheet’s ventilation/environmental controls notes contemplate connecting (“tied into”) construction negative-air exhaust to a “RE-CIRCULATED AIR SYSTEM.” IMC requires that air removed by every mechanical exhaust system be discharged outdoors and to a location where it cannot be readily drawn back into a ventilating system. Allowing exhaust...

Why it matters: If implemented in the field, this could result in a non-code-compliant exhaust configuration (exhaust not discharged outdoors), creating inspection failure/rework and potential distribution of construction contaminants through the building air system, delaying turnover and increasing costs.

Suggested next step: Revise the ICRA/Dust Control Plan notes to delete the option to tie negative-air exhaust into any recirculated/shared HVAC system, and require all temporary mechanical exhaust/negative-air discharge to the outdoors in compliance with IMC 501.3 (and to a location not readily drawn back into ventilation systems).

RFI draft: Revise the ICRA/Dust Control Plan notes to delete the option to tie negative-air exhaust into any recirculated/shared HVAC system, and require all temporary mechanical exhaust/negative-air discharge to the outdoors in compliance with IMC 501.3 (and to a location not readily drawn back into...

Summary: The sheet specifies the new fuel oil tank will include “SUBMERSIBLE TURBINE PUMPS.” IMC 2018 requires that fuel-oil pumps (when not part of an appliance) be “of a positive-displacement type.” A submersible turbine pump is a different pump type than a positive-displacement pump, so the specified pump type conflicts with IMC requirements.

Why it matters: This is a major equipment selection issue. If installed as shown, it can be rejected at permitting/inspection and would require pump re-selection and potential controls/piping changes, creating procurement delays and cost impacts.

Suggested next step: Revise the fuel oil pump specification to comply with IMC 1302.7 (positive-displacement type), or provide a code-based justification that these pumps are part of a listed appliance/system such that IMC 1302.7 does not apply, and confirm compliance with all requirements of IMC 1302.7.

RFI draft: Revise the fuel oil pump specification to comply with IMC 1302.7 (positive-displacement type), or provide a code-based justification that these pumps are part of a listed appliance/system such that IMC 1302.7 does not apply, and confirm compliance with all requirements of IMC 1302.7.

Summary: The fuel-oil return piping (labeled “FOR”) is shown with inline valve symbols on the return line serving the temporary boiler trailer. IMC Section 1305.4 explicitly prohibits installing valves on fuel-oil return piping.

Why it matters: Installing valves on the return line can allow the return to be inadvertently closed, which can prevent proper return flow and create unsafe operating conditions. This will likely be rejected at inspection and require field rework (valve removal/repiping), causing schedule delays and added cost.

Suggested next step: Confirm that the dashed “FOR” line is the fuel-oil return. If yes, revise the detail to remove all valves from the return piping in compliance with IMC 1305.4, and provide the compliant arrangement/details for isolation/maintenance if required.

RFI draft: Confirm that the dashed “FOR” line is the fuel-oil return. If yes, revise the detail to remove all valves from the return piping in compliance with IMC 1305.4, and provide the compliant arrangement/details for isolation/maintenance if required.