Large Multifamily Plan Review: 757 Issues Found

Summary: 309 index entries | 12 perfect matches | 1 mismatched | 296 missing Mismatched (1): VT01: Expected: | Actual: GENERAL ELEVATOR INFORMATION (p14) Missing (296) — listed in drawing index but not found in the document: Electrical: - E401A 1ST FLOOR HVAC POWER PLAN - AREA A - E401B 1ST FLOOR HVAC POWER PLAN - AREA B -...

Why it matters:

Suggested next step:

RFI draft: 📄 T001 Schedule Text: DRAWING INDEX — page 13 --- 📄 VT01 Schedule Text: DRAWING INDEX — page 14

Summary: Plumbing details indicate an 8-inch domestic water backflow device as a reduced pressure zone assembly (RPZ), while the civil utility detail for the 8-inch domestic water meter/backflow assembly indicates a double detector check assembly. These are different backflow preventer types and are not interchangeable for AHJ approval and installation...

Why it matters: If constructed per the wrong backflow type, the installation may be rejected by the water authority/AHJ, cause procurement delays (different device, valves, drains/relief requirements), and require rework at the building/site transition where the meter and backflow assembly is installed.

Suggested next step: Confirm the required 8' backflow preventer type for the domestic water service (RPZ vs double detector check) and provide the governing standard/water authority requirement. Clarify which sheet(s) must be revised so plumbing and civil show the same backflow assembly and associated appurtenances.

RFI draft: Confirm the required 8' backflow preventer type for the domestic water service (RPZ vs double detector check) and provide the governing standard/water authority requirement. Clarify which sheet(s) must be revised so plumbing and civil show the same backflow assembly and associated appurtenances.

Summary: On A502, the service elevator pit plan shows dimensions including '10'-0 3/8'' and '8'-7 7/8''. On VT02, the 1st floor service elevator pit plan calls for '8' - 5' CLEAR' 'WALL TO WALL' and '9' - 11' CLEAR' 'WALL TO WALL'. These pit/hoistway dimensions do not match between the architectural sheet and the vertical transportation requirements.

Why it matters: A mismatch in required pit/hoistway clear dimensions can result in the hoistway being constructed too large/small for the selected elevator equipment, affecting rail/bracket layout, pit equipment clearances, and potentially requiring demolition/rework of the pit/shaft walls after construction has started.

Suggested next step: Confirm the governing service elevator pit/hoistway wall-to-wall clear dimensions (and whether A502 dimensions are to inside face, outside face, or another reference). Revise A502 and/or VT02 so the service elevator pit/hoistway dimensions are coordinated and consistent.

RFI draft: Confirm the governing service elevator pit/hoistway wall-to-wall clear dimensions (and whether A502 dimensions are to inside face, outside face, or another reference). Revise A502 and/or VT02 so the service elevator pit/hoistway dimensions are coordinated and consistent.

Summary: On A502, the inmate elevator pit plan shows dimensions including '10'-8 3/8'' and '9'-4 3/8'' (with an additional adjacent dimension of '9 1/8'') but these dimensions are not labeled as 'CLEAR' or 'WALL TO WALL'. On VT03, the 1st floor inmate elevator pit plan explicitly calls for '8' - 5' CLEAR' 'WALL TO WALL' and '9' - 11' CLEAR' 'WALL TO...

Why it matters: If the pit/hoistway is laid out in the field using A502’s dimension references but elevator equipment/clearance is based on VT03’s 'CLEAR WALL TO WALL' requirements, the constructed shaft/pit may not provide the required clearances and could drive redesign, clearance conflicts, or rework.

Suggested next step: Confirm the governing inmate elevator pit/hoistway wall-to-wall clear dimensions and clearly state which reference faces A502 dimensions are taken to (e.g., clear vs face-of-wall). Update A502 and/or VT03 so the pit/hoistway dimensions and basis (CLEAR/WALL TO WALL vs other) are consistent across the drawing set.

RFI draft: Confirm the governing inmate elevator pit/hoistway wall-to-wall clear dimensions and clearly state which reference faces A502 dimensions are taken to (e.g., clear vs face-of-wall). Update A502 and/or VT03 so the pit/hoistway dimensions and basis (CLEAR/WALL TO WALL vs other) are consistent...

Summary: On LI-100, the irrigation schedule specifies a reduced pressure backflow preventer: 'Febco 860 2\'\nReduced Pressure Backflow Preventer'. However, the irrigation plan and the referenced detail on LS-501 call for a pressure vacuum breaker: 'PRESSURE VACUUM BREAKER'. The LS-501 PVB detail also indicates a different size at the service side:...

Why it matters: Backflow preventer type/size impacts code compliance, authority approval, installation configuration, and hydraulic performance. Installing the wrong backflow assembly could cause inspection failure and require rework at the point of connection.

Suggested next step: Confirm the required backflow preventer device type (Reduced Pressure vs Pressure Vacuum Breaker) and confirm the required size (2' vs 1-1/2'). Update the irrigation schedule and/or LS-501 Detail 7 and plan callouts so the drawing set is consistent.

RFI draft: Confirm the required backflow preventer device type (Reduced Pressure vs Pressure Vacuum Breaker) and confirm the required size (2' vs 1-1/2'). Update the irrigation schedule and/or LS-501 Detail 7 and plan callouts so the drawing set is consistent.

Summary: The Life Safety Summary lists different floor occupant loads than the “TOTAL OCCUPANTS” tables shown on the corresponding Life Safety Plans. Specifically, the summary lists “1ST FLOOR\t378” and “2ND FLOOR\t431”, while the 1st floor plan total indicates “389 OCC” and the 2nd floor plan total indicates “408 OCC”. These are direct contradictions...

Why it matters: Conflicting occupant loads can change required egress capacity (door/stair widths and counts), travel distance compliance assumptions, and overall code compliance documentation. This can trigger plan review comments and creates risk of under/over-sizing egress components if the wrong occupant loads are used.

Suggested next step: Confirm the correct occupant load for each level (1st floor, 2nd floor, mezzanine) and identify which document is authoritative. Revise either the Life Safety Summary or the floor plan “TOTAL OCCUPANTS” tables so the occupant loads match and are used consistently for egress sizing and code analysis.

RFI draft: Confirm the correct occupant load for each level (1st floor, 2nd floor, mezzanine) and identify which document is authoritative. Revise either the Life Safety Summary or the floor plan “TOTAL OCCUPANTS” tables so the occupant loads match and are used consistently for egress sizing and code analysis.

Summary: At the expansion joint/bridge framing, sheet S102a calls out the member as 'W16X36 TOS 24'-0 7/8\'', while sheet S102c calls out 'W16X36 TOS 24'-2\'' for the same expansion-joint condition. These are conflicting TOS elevations for a W16X36 member at the expansion joint.

Why it matters: A TOS discrepancy at an expansion joint/bridge tie-in can cause steel shop drawing errors, misaligned connections, and field fit-up issues at the interface to adjacent framing/existing structure.

Suggested next step: Confirm the correct TOS for the W16X36 member(s) at the expansion joint/bridge bay and revise the affected sheets so the W16X36 elevation callout is consistent across S102a and S102c (and any related sheets).

RFI draft: Confirm the correct TOS for the W16X36 member(s) at the expansion joint/bridge bay and revise the affected sheets so the W16X36 elevation callout is consistent across S102a and S102c (and any related sheets).

Summary: Sheet VT01 defines the car safety force transmitted to the pit as the “CAR R3” rail force and lists it as 30.7 kips for the SERVICE elevator. However, sheet VT02’s PIT REACTION TABLE lists the “CAR SAFETY (SEE CAR R3 RAIL FORCES)” reaction as 33.6 kips each for the same duty elevators, which conflicts with the VT01 R3 value that VT02 references.

Why it matters: The pit slab/footing, buffer supports, and pit structural design depend on the governing car safety (R3) reaction. A 30.7 kip vs 33.6 kip discrepancy can lead to under-design (safety risk) or over-design (cost/constructability impacts) and prevents confident coordination of structural reactions with the hoistway section requirements.

Suggested next step: Confirm the correct CAR SAFETY / CAR R3 reaction to be used for pit structural design for the 4500# @ 200 FPM MRL elevators, and clarify whether the VT02 “33.6 EACH” includes any impact/seismic/vendor-envelope adjustments that differ from VT01’s “30.7”. Update VT01/VT02 so the referenced values match.

RFI draft: Confirm the correct CAR SAFETY / CAR R3 reaction to be used for pit structural design for the 4500# @ 200 FPM MRL elevators, and clarify whether the VT02 “33.6 EACH” includes any impact/seismic/vendor-envelope adjustments that differ from VT01’s “30.7”. Update VT01/VT02 so the referenced values...

Summary: Sheet T002’s 'TYPICAL ACCESSIBLE TOILET - CODE REQ'D CLEARANCE' vignette states '48\' x 66\' clear floor space req'd (front access)' and '48\' x 56\' clear floor space req'd (side access)'. The ADA guideline excerpt on sheet T002a states: '604.3.1 Size. Clearance around a water closet shall be 60 inches (1525 mm) minimum' (and '56 inches (1420...

Why it matters: If restroom layouts/partitions are designed or built using the smaller clear floor spaces shown on T002, the installed toilet clearances may not comply with the ADA criteria excerpted on T002a, potentially requiring rework of partitions/doors/fixture locations and impacting accessibility approvals.

Suggested next step: Clarify the governing required clearance at accessible water closets for this project and revise either the T002 'CODE REQ'D CLEARANCE' vignette or the ADA guideline basis so the required water-closet clear space is consistent across sheets before construction/layout.

RFI draft: Clarify the governing required clearance at accessible water closets for this project and revise either the T002 'CODE REQ'D CLEARANCE' vignette or the ADA guideline basis so the required water-closet clear space is consistent across sheets before construction/layout.

Summary: Sheet T003’s 2-hour fire-rated partition (UL Design No. U419) calls for two layers of 5/8' gypsum board on both sides of the wall. On Sheet T004, in the notes under the “PATCH @ PENETRATIONS IN RATED / SMOKE WALLS” detail, Note 2 states that only one layer on each side of wall is required for 1- or 2-hour walls. This creates an...

Why it matters: If the T004 note is followed for 2-hour rated conditions where the intended/required assembly is UL U419 (2 layers each side), patching/repair or construction could be performed with insufficient layers, potentially resulting in a nonconforming assembly and creating life-safety and inspection/acceptance risk.

Suggested next step: Confirm the intended gypsum board layer requirement for 2-hour rated partitions (UL U419). Should 2-hour walls use “(2) LAYERS 5/8\' ... BOTH SIDES” as shown on T003, and should T004 Note 2 be revised/clarified to indicate whether it applies only to patching at penetrations (and how it applies when the existing rated wall has multiple layers)?...

RFI draft: Confirm the intended gypsum board layer requirement for 2-hour rated partitions (UL U419). Should 2-hour walls use “(2) LAYERS 5/8\' ... BOTH SIDES” as shown on T003, and should T004 Note 2 be revised/clarified to indicate whether it applies only to patching at penetrations (and how it applies...

Summary: The foundation drawing’s typical anchor bolt detail depicts an anchor rod with an embedded end plate (cast-in style). The specification requires anchor bolts at cast-concrete to be all-thread rods anchored with Hilti HY270 adhesive. These requirements conflict because an embedded plate anchor is not an adhesive-set all-thread rod installation.

Why it matters: If constructed per the drawing, anchor bolt procurement, installation sequencing (cast-in vs drilled/epoxied), and special inspection expectations may not match the specified system, creating risk of noncompliance and potential load/path performance concerns at column base connections.

Suggested next step: Confirm the required anchor bolt system for base plates at cast-concrete foundations: (1) adhesive-set A36 galvanized all-thread rods with Hilti HY270 per spec, or (2) cast-in anchor rods with embedded plate per the typical anchor bolt detail. Provide the governing detail/notes to follow and any required revisions to S106 details.

RFI draft: Confirm the required anchor bolt system for base plates at cast-concrete foundations: (1) adhesive-set A36 galvanized all-thread rods with Hilti HY270 per spec, or (2) cast-in anchor rods with embedded plate per the typical anchor bolt detail. Provide the governing detail/notes to follow and any...

Summary: S503 Section 7 shows 5/8' all-thread rods embedded into the “EXISTING CONCRETE BUILDING” using “HILTI HY200 V3 ADHESIVE.” General Notes 33 states that anchor bolts at “CAST-CONCRETE” shall be anchored with “HILTI HY270 ADHESIVE (BASIS-OF-DESIGN PRODUCT).” The Section 7 detail does not explicitly state whether the “existing concrete building” is...

Why it matters: If the existing concrete at this condition is intended to be covered by the cast-concrete note, specifying HY200 V3 instead of the basis-of-design HY270 could affect anchor capacity/installation requirements and may lead to submittal/inspection issues. If it is not cast-concrete (or is intended as a different condition), the drawings should...

Suggested next step: For the 5/8' all-thread rods into the “EXISTING CONCRETE BUILDING” shown in S503 Section 7, confirm whether this substrate is to be treated as “CAST-CONCRETE” per General Note 33 and which adhesive is required. Revise Section 7 and/or General Notes to clearly indicate HY270 (basis-of-design) or provide engineered approval/documentation if HY200...

RFI draft: For the 5/8' all-thread rods into the “EXISTING CONCRETE BUILDING” shown in S503 Section 7, confirm whether this substrate is to be treated as “CAST-CONCRETE” per General Note 33 and which adhesive is required. Revise Section 7 and/or General Notes to clearly indicate HY270 (basis-of-design) or...

Summary: The exam light support detail notes: 'ALL THREADED RODS SHALL BE INSTALLED WITH HILTI HIT HY 200 EPOXY ADHESIVE (BASIS OF DESIGN PRODUCT).' The project general notes require cast-concrete anchor bolts to be 'ANCHORED W/ HILTI HY270 ADHESIVE (BASIS-OF-DESIGN PRODUCT).' These adhesives directly conflict (HIT-HY 200 vs HY270).

Why it matters: Using an adhesive different from the specified basis-of-design for cast-concrete anchors can affect anchor capacity, approvals, and required special inspection acceptance, creating a high risk of failed inspections or required rework.

Suggested next step: Confirm which adhesive is required for the exam light support threaded rod anchors into the roof slab system. If HY270 is required per general notes, revise S402.1 exam light support details/notes accordingly; otherwise issue a written specification deviation/approval for HIT-HY 200.

RFI draft: Confirm which adhesive is required for the exam light support threaded rod anchors into the roof slab system. If HY270 is required per general notes, revise S402.1 exam light support details/notes accordingly; otherwise issue a written specification deviation/approval for HIT-HY 200.

Summary: The drawing’s hanger schedule/details call for “HILTI QUICK BOLT OR EQUAL” / “QUICK BOLT” for concrete floor attachments (Details F and G). The specification requires that anything anchored and/or suspended from a concrete slab use cast-in-place inserts, which directly conflicts with using Quick Bolt anchors for slab-supported/suspended hanger...

Why it matters: Using post-installed anchors where cast-in-place inserts are required can lead to noncompliance with the project requirements and may require rework or redesign of slab attachment points before installation.

Suggested next step: Confirm whether post-installed “HILTI QUICK BOLT OR EQUAL” anchors are acceptable for concrete slab hanger/attachment points shown in Details F/G, or revise the details to use cast-in-place inserts per the specification.

RFI draft: Confirm whether post-installed “HILTI QUICK BOLT OR EQUAL” anchors are acceptable for concrete slab hanger/attachment points shown in Details F/G, or revise the details to use cast-in-place inserts per the specification.

Summary: The drawing’s “RATED SMOKE WALL PENETRATIONS” detail includes an “UNSLEEVED PENETRATIONS” condition for pipes and conduits (including plastic up to 2\'). This conflicts with General Construction Note 40, which requires that all pipe, conduits, and ductwork penetrating through fire-rated floor slabs and partitions be sleeved (except where...

Why it matters: If constructed unsleeved, penetrations through fire-rated partitions may not comply with General Construction Note 40 and could fail fire/life-safety inspection or compromise the required rating of the assembly.

Suggested next step: Confirm whether any pipe/conduit penetrations through fire-rated partitions are permitted to be unsleeved on this project. If not within a shaft/opening exception, revise the penetration details to require sleeving and compliant fire-resistive packing/firestopping at sleeves per the rated assembly requirements.

RFI draft: Confirm whether any pipe/conduit penetrations through fire-rated partitions are permitted to be unsleeved on this project. If not within a shaft/opening exception, revise the penetration details to require sleeving and compliant fire-resistive packing/firestopping at sleeves per the rated...